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Traditions in Conflict: The
Internationalization of Confrontation
Kweku Vanderpuyet
This article considers international norms concerning the right to adver-
sarial confrontation in positing a normative analytical standard of admissibil-
ity with respect to the "right to examine" guaranteed under Article 67(1)(e) of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It considers the
notion of confrontation in the context of both the Continental European tradi-
tion, as well as the Anglo-American Common Law conception of the right,
focusing on U.S. constitutional doctrine and relatively recent developments in
English jurisprudence. It also surveys the scope of the right to examine as
defined by the U.N. Human Rights Committee relative to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and by the European Court
with regard to the European Convention. The article further evaluates the pro-
cedural regime concerning the admission of written evidence not subjected to
cross-examination under the Rome Statute and the ICC's Rules of Procedure
and Evidence and argues that the broad judicial discretion it affords is insuffi-
cient to fully and predictably guarantee the core right to adversarial examina-
tion of witnesses intended under Article 67(1)(e). Ultimately, the article
concludes that a bright-line rule of admissibility is not only a viable interna-
tional standard, but also the one that best protects the hybridized right to
examine as a core due process tenet of the Rome Statute.
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Introduction
The principle of confrontation is an ancient one, dating back to at
least Roman times.1 Today, it is a prevalent feature of the world's major
1. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988). For a fuller exposition, see gener-
ally Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481 (1994) (tracing the history
of face-to-face confrontation). See also STEFANO MAFFEI, THE EUROPEAN RIGHT TO CON-
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criminal justice systems and an integral component of international fair
trial standards. Derived from national constitutionalism and international
human rights, together with other long-established fair trial guarantees, 2
the right to examine one's accusers is universally reflected in regional and
multilateral treaties the world over. 3
While there are complex reasons for the proliferation and, impor-
tantly, the observation of fair trial rights as a whole within the interna-
tional human rights legal framework, the fact that such rights generally
lack an established hierarchy in terms of either their development or
enforcement is contributive. 4 Further, the "increased recognition that a
number of nations share many fundamental legal values and expecta-
tions, ' 5 -including both criminal trial and civil rights intimately connected
FRONTATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: ABSENT, ANONYMOUS AND VULNERABLE WITNESSES
13 (2006) (observing that confrontation dates as far back as Hebrew writings).
2. See U.N. Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities,
Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
on its 46th Session, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24 (June 3, 1994), 85 (noting that fair trial rights have been
an international human rights norm for over 40 years, giving rise to a substantial body
of interpretation in its elaboration and construal), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2,1994.24.En?Opendocument (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2010); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 16(e), annexed
to Agreement Respecting the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nurem-
berg Charter] (providing that "[a] defendant shall have the right through himself or
through his Counsel ... to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution."). See
generally UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. res. 217A (III), art. 11, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (stating that "[elveryone charged with a
penal offence has the right to . . . all the guarantees necessary for his defence.").
3. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(e), Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing, "[iln the determination of any
criminal charge against him, [the accused] shall be entitled . . . in full equality . . . [t]o
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him."). For examples of statutes using
terms nearly identical to the ICCPR see European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6(3)(d), Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, 228, [hereinafter ECHR] (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (as amended by
Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971,
Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998, respectively); see also Statute of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 21(4)(e), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
art. 20(4)(e), Nov. 8 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial
Res.4(XI) 92, '1 2(E)(iii) (Mar. 9, 1992) available at http://www.achpr.org/english/reso-
lutions/resolution09_en.html [hereinafter ACHPR Resolution]; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 67(1)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute] (entered into force July 1, 2002). But see American Convention on
Human Rights, art. 8(2)(f), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR] (pro-
viding for the "right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court," distin-
guishing this provision from other international instruments which do not expressly
provide for in-court confrontation) (emphasis added).
4. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identify-
ing International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitu-
tions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 236-37 (1993).
5. Id. at 235.
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with democracy6 -may account for this phenomenon. However, even given
the broad democratic consensus reflected in customary international law,7
the re-interpretation and refinement of fair trial rights standards as a
whole, and particularly the right to examine, should remain a focal point of
international criminal justice.
Modern fair trial rights are chiefly derived from elements drawn from
two of the world's dominant legal traditions-the Common Law rooted in
England ("Adversarial") and the Civil Law of continental Europe ("Conti-
nental").8 The procedural disparities in these traditions may have a poten-
tially profound impact not only upon due process considerations, but also
on the very conception of a fair trial.9 Although the transplantation and
merging of discrete elements of these systems have greatly contributed to
the expansion of rights-based criminal procedure and are intended to
strengthen international fair trial standards, 10 some commentators argue
that the resultant hybrid system may be substantively impaired." Others
6. Id. at 253 (recognizing that "[t]he link between individual human rights, which
are most susceptible to abuse during the criminal process, and democracy is beyond
question."). See also David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1993) (observing that the ICCPR guarantees civil and
political rights which "limit the power of the State to impose its will on the people under
its jurisdiction."); Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L.
589, 606 (1996) ("[Close] examination of the rights listed in both the UDHR and the
[ICCPR] leaves no doubt that both documents... are attempts to universalize civil and
political rights accepted or aspired to in Western liberal democracies.").
7. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw ch. 18 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press) (2d ed. 2008).
8. While Adversarial and Continental modalities predominate, the world's major
legal traditions also include Marxist-Socialist and Islamic (Sharia). See Bassiouni, supra
note 4, at 244.
9. See, e.g.,Justice Robert H. Jackson, Preface to INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILI-
TARY TRIALS (U.S. Department of State 1945) (observing that "a procedure that is
acceptable as a fair trial in countries accustomed to the Continental system of law may
not be regarded as a fair trial in common-law countries."); see also SALVATORE ZAPPALA,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 16 (Oxford University Press
2003) ("[T]hese models historically reflect different conceptions of 'judicial truth'...
this differentiation reflects two opposing epistemological beliefs: while for the inquisito-
rial paradigm there is an objective truth that the 'inquisitor' must ascertain, for the accu-
satorial approach the truth is the natural and logical result of a pre-determined
process.").
10. See Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR.J. INT'L L. 569, 579 (2000) (observ-
ing the Continental/Adversarial hybrid evidentiary rules employed by the ICTY and
their interaction with the need to maintain fair trials there).
11. See Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-Ameri-
can and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 851-52 (1997) (observing that
the "transplantation of factfinding arrangements between common law and civil law
systems would give rise to serious strains in the recipient justice system . . . a legal
pastiche [can] produce far less satisfactory factfinding result in practice than under
either continental or Anglo-American evidentiary arrangements in their unadulterated
form."); Henri Astier, Rights of the Despised, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, at
31 (observing that "the root of the problem is the hybrid nature of war crimes tribu-
nals."); see also Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas
and the Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REv. 567, 568 (1996) (noting that borrowing across
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argue that this hybridization may considerably attenuate due process.'
2
What, then, of an internationalized right to confrontation?
This article considers the "right to examine" within the Adversarial
and Continental legal traditions, as well as in the context of the ICCPR and
the European Convention on Human Rights (the "European Court"), and
posits a normative analytical approach to Article 67(l)(e) of the Rome Stat-
ute. 13 Part I reviews the right to confront within the broad context of the
Continental mode of procedure. Part 11 considers the Anglo-American
notion of confrontation, focusing on U.S. constitutional doctrine and
recent developments in English law. Parts III and IV consider the right to
examine, as interpreted by the U. N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)
and by the European Court, respectively. Part V examines the ICC's proce-
dures regarding the admissibility of written evidence in view of the right to
examine under the Rome Statute. In conclusion, this article proposes a
bright-line analytical framework as a normative and viable alternative to
the exceedingly broad judicial discretion the Rome Statute and the ICC's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence currently afford in determining the scope
of admissibility of uncross-examined statements.
I. The Civil Law Paradigm
Although some commentators contend that the gap between the
Adversarial and Continental modes of criminal procedure is wide,' 4 a
focus on the operation of Continental procedure suggests otherwise.
1 5
The view that the modern convergence of the two traditions has reduced
their differences, leading to the relative dominance of certain characteris-
tics of one over the other, seems more apt.1 6 No matter how the dichotomy
national and systemic lines risks importing stereotypes "without appreciating the dis-
tinctive relation of the borrowed practice to the premises of the system in which it has
evolved and the living context in which it has taken its form. Indeed, it is commonly
assumed that such borrowings are, at best, risky and, at worst, calamitous.").
12. See Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process
Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 642-43 (2007) (observing
that some have criticized the Nuremberg Charter as fundamentally unfair, and attribut-
ing this to the dilution of due process resulting from the "blending and balancing ele-
ments of the Continental European inquisitorial system and the Anglo-American
adversarial system.") (internal citations omitted); see also Lee A. Casey, The Case Against
The International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 840, 868-69 (2002) (observing
that the Adversarial and Continental systems "do not mix well together" and that "[in
the ICTY, hearsay evidence is admitted virtually without limitation .... Neither the
critical importance of vindicating the accused's right to confront the witnesses against
him, nor the basic human fallibility even of professional judges is acknowledged.");
Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny,
Due Process Deficit, 4 INT'L. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 265 (2004).
13. See Rome Statute, supra note 3.
14. See CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1 (Oxford University Press) (2001) (noting the "the wide gap between the Anglo-Ameri-
can and the Continental traditions of criminal procedure.").
15. Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 549 (1973).
16. WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 1.4(c), n.105, at 175 (2d ed.
1999) ('Just as Anglo-American procedure is not purely adversarial neither is European
Cornell International Law Journal
is characterized, however, fundamental differences have clearly survived
the intermixing of the two traditions, 17 particularly those concerning the
organization of the investigation phase and its correlative structures. 18
A. Mode of Criminal Proceedings
Principally, three distinct but integrated stages define Continental
criminal proceedings: the investigation stage, the examination stage, and
the trial stage. 19 Within this framework, the judiciary is responsible for
controlling the conduct of trial and plays a very active role. 20 At trial, for
example, judges decide which witnesses should be called and may directly
conduct their examination on substantive matters. 2 1 Such witnesses are
traditionally questioned in contemplation of, and based upon, a dossier
which documents evidence gathered during the investigative phase.2 2 The
judiciary is thus chiefly responsible for eliciting the evidence to be relied
upon to adjudicate the guilt of the accused.23
During the early investigation stage, several formative operations are
procedure purely inquisitorial. Thus, commentators often prefer to describe the Euro-
pean process as providing a 'mixed system' in which the inquisitorial characteristics are
dominant.") (internal citations omitted).
17. See Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and Procedure for International Criminal
Law? The Rules of the ICTY, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE
LAw OF THE ICTY 20 (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas, eds., 2003) (observing that by
adhering to the ECHR many Continental countries "have subjected themselves to general
standards of procedural fairness" similar to those of the Adversarial system.).
18. See Gregory A. McClelland, A Non-Adversary Approach to International Criminal
Tribunals, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2002) (discussing the general court
structure and roles under the Continental system).
19. See JAMES G. APPLE & Robert P. Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law System 28
(Federal Judicial Center 1995); see also R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2
W.L.R. 47, 11 59, 62, at 109 (appeal taken from Eng.) (describing, by means of exam-
ples from the French process, the stages of the Continental system, and contrasting the
absence of judicial investigation in Common Law systems).
20. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 421-22 (1992) (noting that the Frenchjuge d'instruction super-
vises the investigation of serious cases, while the police conduct the actual investigation,
including interviews and interrogations; in Italy, these responsibilities belong to the
public magistrate); see also Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Jus-
tice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 317, 325 (1995) (noting that while the investigatory judge "still domi-
nates pretrial procedure in many other continental systems," in Germany, the office of
the investigatory judge was terminated over thirty years ago and that prosecutors "are
responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offense."); Antonia Sherman,
Sympathy for the Devil: Examining a Defendant's Right to Confront Before the International
War Crimes Tribunal, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 833, 861-62 (1996) (comparing the roles of
judges in Adversarial and Continental systems to those of "impartial referee" and "active
inquisitor," respectively).
21. See Damaska, supra note 15, at 525 (noting with regard to judicial control of the
trial inquest that "whatever evidence [the judge] decides to examine becomes his-or,
rather, the court's-evidence.").
22. See, e.g., Frase & Weigend, supra note 20, at 334 ("German professional judges
usually are familiar with the complete file of the investigation before a trial begins.").
23. See Raneta Lawson Mack, It's Broke So Let's Fix It: Using a Quasi-Inquisitorial
Approach to Limit the Impact of Bias in the American Criminal Justice System, 7 IND. INT'L
& CoMP. L. REV. 63, 81 (1996) (observing that Continental judges are "proactive in
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carried out under the direction and authority of an investigating judge2 4
who is vested with considerable powers. 25 Amongst other formal devices
at his control, he may seek out or identify suspects, have crime scenes
processed, or have interrogations conducted.26 Generally, it is during this
stage that most evidence is acquired. 2 7 As mentioned above, the dossier
records this evidence, including police reports, physical evidence, expert
reports, and other important documents and materials. 28
A judicial or prosecutorial official normally compiles the dossier,
which further includes information derived from the interrogation of rele-
vant witnesses, among whom may be those proffered by the defense, as
well as the accused. 29 Therefore, officials responsible for the preparation
of the dossier are typically charged with collecting both incriminating and
exculpatory evidence relevant to a given investigation. 3 0 As the theory
goes, the direct and substantial involvement of the judiciary in the investi-
gation phase "permits the court to dispense with many of the witnesses,
and the procedural safeguards, required in an Anglo-American forum."
3 1
Although the development of the dossier marks the investigation
phase, it also informs the examination phase and subsequent proceedings
to varying degrees. In some cases, reliance upon the dossier is so profound
that it may virtually obviate the need for trial testimony. However, in other
cases its impact is less drastic. 3 2 Nevertheless, the dossier forms an impor-
developing most, if not all, of the evidence during the trial.") (internal citations
omitted).
24. See Boas, supra note 17, at 21-22 (noting that "several continental European
systems of criminal procedure... do not have the investigating judge as part of their
investigation process," referencing the German system where the prosecutor decides
which cases to take to trial and the Danish system, where the police carry out
investigations).
25. Id. at 20-22 (focusing on the French, Dutch and Belgian systems).
26. See generally, Felicity Nagorcka, Michael Stanton & Michael Wilson, Stranded
Between Partisanship and the Truth? A Comparative Analysis of Legal Ethics in the Adver-
sarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 448, 456 (2005) (noting
the broad authority provided to investigating judges under the French Code of Criminal
Procedure to, inter alia, order searches and seizures, interrogate suspects and witnesses,
and to manage the confrontation of witnesses with the accused).
27. BRON McKILLOP & SIMON STRETTON, INQUISITORIAL SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND THE ICAC: A COMPARISON § 1.3, at 3 (New South Wales Parliamentary Joint Commit-
tee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption 1994).
28. See id. § 1.4, at 4.
29. See McClelland, supra note 18, at 14 (citing Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Mitchell Lec-
ture, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 365 (1977)); see also McKILLOP & STRETTON, supra note 27,
§ 1.4, at 4 (noting, inter alia, that the accused's personal background and criminal his-
tory form an integral part of the dossier).
30. See Thomas Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European Criminal Procedures: True
or Illusive Model?, 9 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12 (1981) (providing examples drawn from the
German and French systems).
31. Michael J. Frank, Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Crimi-
nal Court of Iraq, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 60 (2006); see also Nagorcka et al., supra note 26,
at 460 (observing that "[tihe lack of rules of evidence is a reflection of the fact that the
duty to collect evidence and 'search for the truth' is given to a qualified and impartial
judge.").
32. See William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adver-
sarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 429, 434 (2004) (stating that "in some
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tant and characteristic component of traditional Continental systems, 33
substantively influencing all phases of the trial process.
34
During the examination phase, judges actively continue gathering evi-
dence in order to further elaborate the dossier.3 5 Although during this
phase an accused is afforded "[tihe opportunity to cast doubt on the credi-
bility of witnesses, submit comments on evidence and request further
investigations on [his own] behalf,"36 adversarial cross-examination is
functionally unavailable.3 7 In practice, the questioning of witnesses typi-
cally proceeds substantially unchallenged. 38  Not unlike other witnesses,
an accused too may be called upon to give information during the exami-
nation phase.39 While he retains the right against self-incrimination in
these circumstances, 40 an accused's refusal to cooperate may be viewed as
damaging to his credibility. 41 Upon the conclusion of the examination
phase, the record to be relied upon during the trial phase has generally
been fully developed by the investigating judicial or prosecutorial official-
at least with that evidence considered by them to be valid and relevant. 42
[C]ontinental countries ... the trial usually consists of a discussion of the materials in
the dossier in an attempt to determine the issue of guilt and the appropriate punish-
ment.") (internal citations omitted); see also McKILLOP & STRETrON, supra note 27, § 1.5,
at 4 (remarking that "the traditional inquisitorial trial is essentially a process of public
confirmation of the results of the investigation.").
33. See McKILLOi, & STRETTON, supra note 27, §1.2 at 3 (observing that the process
of investigation "is the crucial phase as it establishes the dossier which is the basis for
the subsequent progression, the backbone of the process."). This ordinarily occurs
upon the transmission of the dossier by the investigative judge to a panel of judges for a
probable cause determination. See McClelland, supra note 18, at 15.
34. See McKILLOP & STRETTON, supra note 27, §1.4, at 4 (noting that "the dossier
forms the basis for the progression of a criminal case . . . [and] shapes the trial and
informs appellate review.").
35. See R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [20101 2 W.L.R. 47, 1 60, at 109 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
36. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON TRIAL 11 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq1005/iraql005.pdf (internal cita-
tions omitted).
37. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 19, at 28 (observing that the Continental exam-
ination phase provides "no counterpart to common-law cross-examination."); see also R.
v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, 11 60, at 109 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (observing that witnesses could be examined during this phase without the pres-
ence of the suspect and his lawyer "unless the examining judge chose to arrange a con-
frontation with the suspect.").
38. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 11, at 843-44 (noting that the Continental judge
"retains the monopoly of witness' examination.").
39. See R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, 60, at 109 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (noting that suspects could be detained and repeatedly interrogated
during the examination phase).
40. See Casey, supra note 12, at 868.
41. See McClelland, supra note 18, at 18 (noting that while a Continental defendant
is placed in the position of having to respond to questions, he may refuse. However, this
refusal "may be more damaging to his credibility than a common law defendant's silent
declination to participate."); see also Nagorcka et al., supra note 26, at 455 (noting that
"[tihe right to silence does exist in the French system; however its exercise can give rise
to an unfavourable inference against the accused, as he or she is regarded as a necessary
source of information in revealing the truth.").
42. See Casey, supra note 12, at 868.
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The trial, which is then carried out on the basis of the dossier, is sub-
stantially de-emphasized in Continental criminal proceedings. In contra-
distinction to the Adversarial model, which develops facts at the trial
phase, the focus of the Continental trial is centered upon the investigation
of the facts during the investigation phase. As such, in some cases the trial
itself may solely be comprised of arguments advanced by the prosecution
and the defense as to their respective interpretations of an essentially pre-
established record.
4 3
B. Confrontation
Prior to the twentieth century, the principle of confrontation in Conti-
nental Europe was uncommon. 4 4 It had been greatly attenuated during
medieval times, during which the procedures of the Inquisition took
hold. 45 These were dependent upon secret and anonymous evidence in
order to preserve social order and uproot dissidence. 46 Evidence in crimi-
nal cases was thus received "under a 'veil of secrecy' and the door was left
'wide open to mendacity, falsehood, and partiality.' 4 7 Suspects were not
afforded an opportunity to confront such evidence.48 Given these histori-
cal underpinnings, it is hardly surprising that the role of the parties in
modern Continental trials is relatively reduced and subsidiary to that of
the judge. 49
Indeed at trial, "[t]he involvement of the public prosecutor and
defense attorney is generally limited to asking occasional follow-up ques-
tions or suggesting other lines of inquiry" to the presiding judge.50 Con-
comitantly, cross-examination by counsel is relatively infrequent.5 '
Likewise, even though the participation of an accused is active, 5 2 his role
as far as exercising his rights in his own defense (such as the right to
silence) tends to be lesser than that typically observed in Adversarial pro-
43. Id.
44. See MAFFEI, supra note 1, at 15-16.
45. See R. v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128, 95, at 1137-38 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 19, at 37 (noting that, as the principle inquisi-
tors, the elevated status of judges in Continental systems "result[s] in a concomitant
derogation of the role of lawyers during the trial."); cf. Frase & Weigend, supra note 20,
at 342 (observing that although the parties within the German system "may play a fairly
active role," the court controls the proceedings).
50. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1992).
51. Gordon, supra note 12, at 643, citing Michael P. Scharf, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE
STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 10 (Carolina
Academic Press 1997).
52. See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 50, at 14 (noting that "[t]he defendant tradi-
tionally plays an active role in a civil law trial.").
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ceedings.5 3 Indeed, an accused's involvement in Continental proceedings,
even from the early stage of being a mere suspect, generally entails a con-
tinuing "dialogue with investigatory and judicial authorities throughout the
pre-trial and trial phases."54
The principle of the procedure contradictoire-a feature that provides
that "all parties in a criminal proceeding must be allowed full opportunity
to be informed of and to contest evidence, in order that a fair and just
verdict ensues"55-is integral to equality of arms-the notion that the pros-
ecution and defense should have equal access to the court. However, it
does not implicitly subsume the right to confrontation within the Conti-
nental tradition. Rather, it connotes that "the defence must be informed of
all the evidence and arguments that are to be deployed against the defen-
dant, and be given a chance to answer them."56 It is thus fundamentally a
question of fair notice. Nonetheless, until as recently as 2000, Austrian
criminal procedure, for example, permitted the ex parte filing of Public
Prosecutors' observations ("croquis") that could later be relied upon in ren-
dering judgments at both the trial and appeal levels without any provision
or notice to the defense. 57
As such, the principle of a procedure contradictoire is not a true con-
frontation right, but instead one fully steeped in Continental trial proce-
dures, which are "notable for [their] lack of exclusionary rules" s58 and
broad standards of admissibility. Because the Continental system "erects
few evidentiary barriers that restrict the information the judge can con-
sider in determining guilt,"59 the practical implementation of an effective
right to confront or to examine witnesses at trial has generally been
53. Id. at 8 (observing that the exercise of the right to refuse to answer questions is
exceptional); McClelland, supra note 18, at 14; cf. Mark Findlay, Synthesis in Trial Proce-
dures? The Experience of International Criminal Tribunals, 50 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 26, 35
(2001) (noting that "while the presumption of innocence may be accepted, it is expected
that the accused will be an initial witness in his/her defence and that his/her testimony
will answer the inquisition."); Damaska, supra note 15, at 529 (noting that the Continen-
tal system regards an accused "as an evidentiary source before any other evidence has
been examined at the trial.").
54. See McClelland, supra note 18, at 14.
55. Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in
an International Context, 75 IND. L. J. 809, 838 (2000); see also Grundgesetz fur die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany], § IX,
art. 103(1), English translation available at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/
80201000.pdf (providing that "[in the courts every person shall be entitled to a hearing
in accordance with law.").
56. James R. Spencer, Introduction to EuROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 45 (Mirielle
Delmas-Marty & John R. Spencer eds., 2002) (emphasis added).
57. See Brandstetterv. Austria, 211 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) '1 67-69, at 27-28 (1993)
(noting that a lower court's judgment "reproduced almost literally the text of [the cro-
quis]" and stating that "[a]n indirect and purely hypothetical possibility for an accused
to comment on prosecution arguments included in the text of a judgment can scarcely
be regarded as a proper substitute for the right to examine and reply directly to submis-
sions made by the prosecution.") (internal quotations omitted).
58. McClelland, supra note 18, at 19 (stating further that "[r]elevancy and best evi-
dence standards are the main tests of admissibility at civilian trials.") (internal citations
omitted).
59. See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 50, at 7.
Vol. 43
2010 Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation523
regarded as a somewhat secondary consideration in terms of the fairness
of trials.60 Indeed, although the right to examine exists in The Nether-
lands, for example, a judge has discretion to deny a request to examine a
witness if his absence "cannot reasonably be considered prejudicial. 6 1
Traditional Continental systems are thus well-known to allow convic-
tions on the basis of evidence from witnesses that an accused had not been
afforded any prior opportunity to challenge. However, as discussed in Part
IV, the influence of the European Convention has significantly affected
these issues and spurred progressive changes in many national
jurisdictions. 6 2
I. The Adversarial Framework
A. The Common Law Perspective
Adversarial systems generally regard the right of confrontation as an
indispensable component of the fair administration of trials.6 3 Within the
Anglo-American tradition, the right to confront exists at common law
6 4
and is considered integral to the truth-finding function of the courts. 6 5 An
accused is thus afforded a corresponding right to examine adverse wit-
nesses,6 6 which "ordinarily includes the accused's right to have those wit-
60. See A. Beijer & A. M. van Hoorn, Report on Anonymous Witnesses in the Nether-
lands, in NETHERLANDS REPORT TO THE FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARA-
TIVE LAw 523, 524 (E. H. Hcndius ed., 1998) (noting that "[t]he idea that a personal
confrontation between the accused and the witness is an essential requirement to a fair
trial traditionally plays a secondary role in the Dutch criminal justice system" and that
"out-of-court statements can be used in evidence regardless of whether the witness is
available to be called," including the use of "written statements.., even if they emanate
from a person who could have been called.").
61. Id. at 524.
62. See R v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [20081 1 A.C. 1128, ' 24, at 1147 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (noting that "much of the impact of article 6(3)(d) [which provides the right
to examine under the ECHRI has been on the procedures of continental systems which
previously allowed [convictions] on the basis of evidence from witnesses whom he had
not had an opportunity to challenge.") (internal citations omitted).
63. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The rights to confront
and cross-examine witnesses... have long been recognized as essential to due process.");
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (describing confrontation as a "funda-
mental [guarantee] of life and liberty"); see also Sherman, supra note 20, at 856 (noting
"[tihirty-three countries explicitly provide for ... direct confrontation in their constitu-
tions.") (internal citations omitted).
64. See R v. Hilton, [19711 1 Q.B. 421, 423 (C.A.) (observing that British common
law provides that a defendant may cross-examine any witness, including a co-
defendant).
65. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (noting that the purpose of confron-
tation is "to augment accuracy in the factfinding process.").
66. SeeJones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 Q.B. 55, 65 (C.A.) (stating that "[i]t is
only by cross-examination that a witness's evidence can be properly tested .... "); Ken-
tucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (noting that cross-examination is "a 'func-
tional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal
trial.") (internal citations omitted); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)
(noting that "[tihe central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliabil-
ity of the evidence.., by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding.").
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nesses brought 'face-to-face,' in the time-honored phrase."6 7
Normatively, the "right to confront assumes the right to cross-
examine.., by the respective parties.'6 8 Its substantive import therefore, is
to require the appearance of an accuser at trial and in the presence of the
accused. 69 This type of confrontation similarly provides the court with an
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of testimonial evidence. 70 In this
respect, the notion of Adversarial confrontation
means more than that an accused person know what witnesses are saying or
have said about him [and] even more than that the accused be able to hear
them saying it... There must be a confrontation: he must see them as they
depose against him so that he can observe their demeanour. And they for
their part must give their evidence in the face of a present accused .... [Not
doing so] amounts to a per se failure of justice .... 71
At common law, the admissibility of statements against an accused in
lieu of viva voce evidence was, and still is, principally dealt with within the
framework of evidentiary rules. The common law has long-recognized lim-
itations on the right to confrontation, typically grounded in exceptions to
the rules against hearsay evidence. 72 Ordinarily these rules impose certain
predicate conditions on admissibility, including the (un)availability of the
declarant or the demonstration of some indicia of reliability in balancing
competing interests against the rights of the accused. 73
67. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. LJ.
1011, 1101-12 (1998) (analyzing the jurisprudence of the 6th Amendment to the
United States Constitution as developed by the United States Supreme Court).
68. Sherman, supra note 20, at 857 (emphasis added). ICCPR art. 14(3)(e), how-
ever, implicitly permits the contravention of a defendant's individual right to examine by
providing the arguably lesser alternative that he "have [witnesses] examined" by some-
one other than his counsel, such as a judge or investigative magistrate. Some commenta-
tors subscribe to this thesis, particularly with respect to cases involving vulnerable
witnesses or warranting witness anonymity. See, e.g., Sylvia Pieslak, Comment, The
International Criminal Court's Quest to Protect Rape Victims of Armed Conflict: Anonymity
as the Solution, 2 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 138, 175 (2004) (arguing that the prejudice to
the defense as a result of permitting accusatory witness to testify in full anonymity can
be overcome by "employ[ing] the Judges of the Trial Chambers ... as a substitute for the
defense counsel by cross-examining the victim with the questions formulated by the
defense council[sic] and then relay[ing] the answers back.") (internal citations omitted).
69. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (noting that the Confronta-
tion Clause contemplates that a witness who makes testimonial statements admitted
against a defendant will ordinarily be present at trial for cross-examination).
70. See generally Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
71. S. v. Motlatla 1975 (1) SA 814 (Transvaal Provincial Div.) at 815 (S. Mr.).
72. See R v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128, 1 6, at 1138-39 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (recalling exceptions to the right of confrontation in England, inter
alia, dying declarations and res gestae statements); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140
(1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting "it]he Court's effort to tie the [Confrontation]
Clause so directly to the hearsay rule."); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the
Roberts line of cases "constitutionalize[d] the hearsay rule and its exceptions.").
73. See, e.g., R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, 1 27-82, at
59-74 (appeal taken from Eng.) (explaining the fundamental tenets of hearsay
exceptions).
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B. The Constitutional Confrontation Model of the United States
In the U.S., the right of confrontation is enshrined in the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, which provides that in all criminal cases
the accused shall "enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him"-the so-called Confrontation Clause.74 In the U.S., confron-
tation is considered central to society's "core notion of procedural fair-
ness,"7 5 and takes aim at Continental procedure and "particularly its use
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused."'76
Considering the importance of the Confrontation Clause and the anal-
ysis to be applied in determining constitutional limits of the right, the 1980
case of Ohio v. Roberts7 7 effectively struck a balance that was recognized in
U.S. courts for some twenty four years. In Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by a witness
who failed to testify at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause "if it
[bore] adequate 'indicia of reliability." 78 Roberts held that the requisite
degree of reliability sufficient for the admissibility of evidence (without
confrontation) was met where a given statement "f[ell] within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or "a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" had otherwise been made.7 9 Roberts thus reduced the
constitutional standard of admissibility of evidence not subjected to cross-
examination to that contemplated by ordinary rules of evidence.80
The fundamental nature of the right to confrontation has, as a proce-
dural norm, remained consistent in U.S. jurisprudence. However, the limi-
tations it imposes on the admissibility of evidence not subjected to cross-
examination has decidedly not, either procedurally or substantively.
Sharply abrogating Roberts' doctrinal precedent, the 2004 Supreme Court
case of Crawford v. Washington ushered in an entirely new analytical model,
drawing for the first time a key distinction with respect to the constitu-
tional admissibility of the statements of unavailable witnesses based upon
their 'testimonial' quality. 8 1
Crawford eschewed the nebulous analytical framework of Roberts,8 2
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
75. Raymond LaMagna, (Re)Constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining Unavail-
ability and the Value of Live Testimony, 79 S. CAL L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2006).
76. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
77. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
78. Id. at 66.
79. Id.
80. See Timothy O'Toole & Catharine Easterly, Davis v. Washington: Confrontation
Wins the Day, THE CHMPION, March 2007, at 20 (noting that, under Roberts, "in-court
confrontation was reduced from a bedrock, categorical constitutional guarantee to an
often deemed unimportant matter of judicial discretion.").
81. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
82. See id. at 62 (criticizing Roberts' reliability-based framework and noting that
"Idlispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dis-
pensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the
Sixth Amendment prescribes."); see also Won Shin, Crawford v. Washington: Confronta-
tion Clause Forbids Admission of Testimonial Out-of-Court Statements Without Prior Oppor-
tunity To Cross-Examine, 40 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 223, 225 (2005).
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centering instead on the nature of the out-of-court statement, which ulti-
mately determined whether it could be fairly admitted in the absence of
confrontation. Establishing a bright-line rule, Crawford held that the Con-
frontation Clause bars the "admission of testimonial statements of a wit-
ness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and
the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ' 83
Crawford determined that 'testimonial' statements were those that
either paradigmatically or at their core comprise, inter alia, the following:
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a for-
mer trial;84 statements that are the result of structured police question-
ing;8 5 an allocution, guilty plea, or other formal statement admitting
guilt;8 6 letters to the police or government accusing another of wrongdo-
ing, or statements made under circumstances demonstrating "the declar-
ant's awareness or expectation that [they] may later be used at a trial."' 7
The Court reasoned that for these types of hearsay statements that "bear
testimony"88 in a way specifically contemplated by the original framers of
the constitution, "the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy con-
stitutional demands is the one the constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation."8 9
In 2006, the Supreme Court revisited these issues in Davis v. Washing-
ton and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana.90 In Davis, the accused
was convicted primarily based on an emergency call placed by a victim,
who later did not testify at trial. 91 The content of the call was admitted for
the purpose of connecting the accused to the commission of the crime, and
was principally relied upon to establish his identity as the perpetrator.92
On appeal, the accused argued that the conviction had been obtained in
violation of his confrontation rights because he had not been afforded any
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at trial. 93 The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that a statement made to government officials concern-
ing a continuing emergency that is not intended to be preserved as evi-
dence at trial, is non-testimonial. 94 Conversely, a post-emergency
statement that narrates past events relevant to later criminal prosecution is
83. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 (emphasis added). The 6th Amendment, like the
common law, demands the presence of both conditions as a predicate to admissibility of
testimonial hearsay evidence. Id. at 68.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 53 n.4.
86. Id. at 65.
87. United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting Crawford's sug-
gestion that a declarant's awareness or expectation that their statement may be used at
trial is "the determinative factor" of whether a statement bears testimony).
88. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
89. Id. at 69.
90. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S 813 (2006) (consolidating both cases for appeal).
91. Id. at 819.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 822.
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testimonial and therefore inadmissible. 95 In these circumstances, the
Court concluded that the victim was not acting as a witness when she
made the emergency call, nor was her call 'testimony' within the contempla-
tion of the Sixth Amendment.
9 6
In drawing this distinction, Davis makes clear that the right of con-
frontation does not apply to non-testimonial statements at all,9 7 leading
one commentator to observe that while "the right of the accused to con-
front declarants of testimonial hearsay [becomes] clearer ... the right to
confront declarants of nontestimonial hearsay has perished entirely."98
Ultimately, this renders the question of the constitutional admissibility of
evidence not subjected to cross-examination one that is principally fact-
based, unfortunately providing the courts with "the flexibility to reach
varying outcomes based on notions of expediency rather than doctrinal
consistency." 99 Davis thus underscores the unpredictability of constitu-
tional confrontation analysis for which Roberts was roundly criticized-
showing that that uncertainty of outcomes remains, if only having trans-
posed the issues from one concerning the inherent problems in defining
'reliability' to one recast as a question of what it means to be
'testimonial'. 100
In Hammon, the Court considered the nature of statements made to an
investigating officer at the scene of a crime. Unlike Davis, which involved
an emergency call, in Hammon the police went to the accused's home in
response to a domestic disturbance in which the accused's wife reported
that she had been beaten by her husband.'0 1 Mrs. Hammon also filled out
and signed a battery affidavit describing the assault.10 2 However, although
subpoenaed, Mrs. Hammon did not to testify at trial. 0 3 Instead, the police
officer who took her pre-trial statements was nevertheless permitted to tes-
tify about what she told him at the scene pursuant to the excited utterance
exception to the rule against hearsay.' 0 4 The written affidavit was also
introduced at trial as a present sense impression. 10 5
The Court found Mrs. Hammon's oral statement to be testimonial
under Crawford. The facts revealed that it had been made under suffi-
ciently formal circumstances,10 6 and concerned neither an emergency in
95. Id.
96. Id. at 829.
97. See Tom Lininger, Davis and Hammon: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 105 MIcH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/
105/lininger.pdf.
98. Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 271,
280 (2006).
99. Lininger, supra note 97, at 28.
100. Id.
101. See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom., Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S 813 (2006).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 450.
104. Id. at 447-48.
105. Davis, 547 U.S. at 813.
106. Id. at 830.
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progress, nor an immediate physical threat to her person. 10 7 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the only purpose for which Mrs. Hammon was
questioned by the police was as part of an investigation into past criminal
conduct in order to investigate an alleged crime. 108 Hammon's confronta-
tion rights therefore defeated the introduction of his wife's statement
against him because he was never afforded a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. 109
Crawford's bright-line analysis was developed, in part, to avoid uncer-
tainty in the limitations imposed on the admissibility of out-of-court testi-
monial statements introduced against an accused-to effectively insulate
constitutional analysis from "the vagaries of the rules of evidence, [and]
amorphous notions of reliability."' " 0 However, while Crawford was
intended to preserve those constitutional rights drafted by the framers in
absolute terms, "through strict enforcement of categorical guarantees," ''
Davis and Hammon-along with Crawford's progeny in the lower courts-
show that this is far more easily achieved in theory than it will ever be in
practice.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts1 2 presents a recent application of the
Crawford analysis. In Melendez-Diaz the accused was arrested for a street
sale of cocaine. 113 At his trial, bags allegedly possessed and sold by the
accused were admitted into evidence, together with three 'certificates of
analysis' prepared by a laboratory technician attesting to the fact that the
substance identified was cocaine.' 1 4 Massachusetts law permitted the
admission of such drug analysis certificates without requiring the cross-
examination of the technician who actually conducted the scientific
test.' 15 Melendez-Diaz, was convicted of distributing and trafficking
cocaine, which he appealed without success to the Massachusetts Court of
Appeal. 116 On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that the admission of the drug
analysis certificates violated his confrontation rights.1 17 However, the
107. Id. at 829-30.
108. Id.
109. See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
110. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (internal quotations omitted);
see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting, that con-
frontation rights are "no longer subsumed by the evidentiary rules governing the admis-
sion of hearsay statements.").
111. Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Blakely Primer: Drawing the Line in Crawford and Blakely, THE
CHAMPIoN, Aug. 2004, at 18, 19 (observing of Crawford that "the lesson is that bright-
line rules are often the best way to achieve fairness and justice.").
112. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
113. Id. at 2530.
114. Id. at 2530-31.
115. See David Mansfield, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Laboratory Testing and the
Confrontation Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 161, 164 (2009) (inter-
nal citations omitted), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djclpp/index.php?action =
downloadarticle&id=94.
116. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
117. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152, at *4 n.3
(Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007), overruled by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct.
2527 (2009).
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Massachusetts Court of Appeal determined that their introduction did not
violate the Confrontation Clause, relying on Massachusetts precedent
holding that such certificates were non-testimonial business records. 118
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, finding the certificates to be testi-
monial 1 9 and their admission in the absence of an opportunity for cross-
examination a clear violation of the Confrontation Clause. 120 Even this
relatively straightforward application of Crawford however, drew strong
criticism in a dissenting opinion, which described the Court's analysis as
heralding "a body of formalistic and wooden rules, divorced from prece-
dent, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the [Confrontation]
Clause."121
Although Melendez-Diaz was considered a welcomed application of
Crawford's confrontation analysis by the Supreme Court,122 it also under-
scored the fact that Crawford's promise of finally clarifying the scope of the
constitutional admissibility of evidence not subjected to cross-examination
has fallen well shy of achieving the predictable analytical framework
toward which it was expressly aimed. Instead, it has become mired in
semantic complexities and fact-intensive ad hoc determinations 12 3 that
have vexed prosecutors, defendants, and courts alike, and continue to do
so. 124 Nevertheless, much of this uncertainty has far less to do with the
viability of a bright-line standard of admissibility as such than it has to do
118. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705-06 (2005)).
119. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (noting the certif-
icates were "quite plainly affidavits" and "functionally identical to live, in-court testi-
mony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination."') (internal citations
omitted).
120. Id. at 2531(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
121. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
122. See Steven N. Yermish, Melendez-Diaz and the Application of Crawford in the Lab,
The CHAMPION, Aug. 2009, at 28 (observing that Melendez-Diaz, in a straightforward
application of Crawford, "further clarified the elusive definitional parameters of 'testimo-
nial statement."').
123. See Geetanjli Malhotra, Resolving The Ambiguity Behind The Bright-Line Rule: The
Effect of Crawford v. Washington on the Admissibility of 911 Calls in Evidence-Based Domes-
tic Violence Prosecutions, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 218 (noting three positions taken by
courts and scholars: first, a narrow construction of 'testimonial' such that, admitting
statements made in the course of emergency calls does not violate the Confrontation
Clause; second, a broad construction of 'testimonial', such that emergency calls report-
ing crimes are per se testimonial; and third, advocating that a determination of the testi-
monial nature of such calls be made on an ad hoc basis); see also Neil R. Janulewicz,
Constitutional Law- Allowing Excited Utterances to Affect Characterizing Accusatory State-
ments as Testimonial Statements Contradicts Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence- United
States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 559, 562-63 (2007)
(noting that courts have applied varying tests of 'testimonial': first, a test "characterizing
only formalized statements to government authorities as testimonial," and second, "a
reasonableness test, characterizing all statements a reasonable speaker would foresee
that the government would use in a future investigation or prosecution as testimonial.").
Furthermore, other courts handle the effect of hearsay exceptions concerning such
statements disparately.
124. See Daniel B. Shanes, Confronting Testimonial Hearsay: Understanding the New
Confrontation Clause, 40 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 879, 879 (2009) (observing that even after
Davis v. Washington, pressing questions remain "leaving some courts scratching their
heads.").
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with Crawford having simply failed to establish a sufficiently precise frame-
work to do so effectively. 125
C. Confrontation in England
1. Hearsay Developments
While both U.S. courts and the European Court have increasingly
tended towards narrowing the scope and substantive admissibility of hear-
say not subjected to cross-examination, English courts seem to have gone
the other way. 126 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 ("CJA 2003")127 expands
the ability of English courts to receive precisely such evidence, 128 albeit on
a regulated basis. 129 Although the right of confrontation is not abso-
lute, 130 and may be curtailed in very limited circumstances-for example,
where it is forfeited131-CJA 2003 § 114 is something quite apart, provid-
ing that an out-of-court statement "is admissible as evidence of any matter
stated" under three specific conditions and a surprisingly broad
catchall.132
The first three conditions permitting the admission of evidence not
subjected to cross-examination under section 114 comprise other statutory
provisions of the CJA 2003, the common law, and the agreement of the
125. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (refusing to precisely define
testimonial statements); see id. at 69 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) (remarking that the
majority opinion leaves a "mantle of uncertainty.").
126. LORRAINE WOLHUTER, ET AL., VICTIMOLOGY, VICTIMISATION AND VICTIMS' RIGHTS,
134 (Routedge Cavendish 2008) (observing the recent tendency of English courts to
"give weight to victims' interests/rights in the proportionality element of the defendant's
right to a fair trial in article 6 ECHR").
127. See Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (Eng.) [hereinafter CJA 2003].
128. See id. § 116. For a few examples of cases applying CJA 2003, see R. v Tahery
(Alireza) [2006] EWCA Crim 529, IN 20-26 (U.K.) (permitting the reading of state-
ments at trial where the witness was unavailable due to fear of personal harm); R. v.
Sellick, 20051 EWCA (Crim) 651, [20051 1 W.L.R. 3257, TI 61-68, at 3277-79 (U.K.)
(same); R. v. Al-Khawaja, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2697, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1078 C[26-28, at
1085-86 (U.K.) (finding that the admission of testimony by a deceased declarant did
not render the trial unfair).
129. R.v. T (D), [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1213, [2009] 173 J.P. 425 (U.K.), 1 34 (noting
that "evidence was wrongly admitted [where there] was no evidence to establish that
such steps as were reasonably practicable to find [the declarants] had been taken."). The
court also observed that "the right to confrontation is a longstanding requirement of the
common law and recognized in Article 6(3)(d). It is only to be departed from in the
limited circumstances and under the conditions set out in the CJA 2003. The witness
must be given all possible support, but also made to understand the importance of the
citizen's duty." Id. 25 (internal citation omitted).
130. See William E. O'Brian, The Right of Confrontation: U.S. and European Perspec-
tives, 121 L.Q.R. 481, 494 (2005).
131. See R. v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128, 1 68, at 1161 (noting that
the judicial maxim that justice "will not permit a party to take advantage of his own
wrong" applies to the right of confrontation) (internal citations omitted); see also Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 62 (2004) (noting that "forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.").
132. CJA 2003, supra note 127, § 114(1).
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parties.13 3 The fourth and most troubling, prescribes a residual "interests
of justice" ground for admissibility. 134 These provisions fundamentally
impact the common law rules, greatly expanding the potential for the ero-
sion of traditional tenets of adversarial confrontation, which have been
long-recognized in England. 13 5 In fairness, the CJA 2003 also provides
compensatory measures designed to counter-balance the prejudicial effect
of these newly expanded grounds of hearsay admissibility on the rights of
an accused. These are set out in §§ 124, 125 and 126 of the Act.
§ 124 of the CJA 2003 allows the admission of evidence to discredit a
non-testifying declarant to the same extent as if the witness had testified at
trial. 136 Similarly, § 125 authorizes the court to direct an acquittal or to
discharge a jury where a given case is based upon hearsay that would
render a conviction unsafe. 13 7 As such, it is calculated to ensure the relia-
bility of such evidence. Additionally, § 126 affords the court the discretion
to exclude hearsay where, on balance, its exclusion substantially outweighs
the factors supporting its admission. 138 § 126 further preserves the
courts' discretion to exclude unfair prosecution hearsay evidence under
§ 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.139
Despite a carefully undertaken legislative process prior to its enact-
ment, as applied, the CJA 2003 may be at odds with the current jurispru-
dence of the European Court concerning the right to examine. 140
133. Id. § 114(1)(a)-(c) (providing for the admission of hearsay evidence "if, but only
if- (a) any [statute] makes it admissible, (b) any [common law rule] makes it admissi-
ble, (c) all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible.").
134. Id. § 114(1)(d) (providing for the admissibility of hearsay evidence where "the
court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible.").
135. R. v. T (D), [20091 EWCA (Crim) 1213, [2009] 173 J.P. 425 (U.K.), 9 25 (inter-
nal citations omitted).
136. See R. v. Taylor, [2006] All ER (D) 32, 32 (Jul) (noting that CJA 2003 § 124
permits a judge to strike a fair balance between the interests of the parties in cases
where a key witness is not available to testify and submit to cross-examination as to his
credibility). This principle is embraced by other national acts regulating the admissibil-
ity of anonymous statements. See, e.g., Evidence Act 1843, § 31J(1)(b)-(c) (Jam.) (rele-
vant portions amended 1995), available at http://www.moj.gov.jm/laws/statutes/
The%2OEvidence%2OAct.pdf.
137. CJA 2003, supra note 127, § 125(1) (providing that "if... the court is satisfied...
after the close of [the prosecution's case] that- (a) the case against the defendant is
based wholly or partly on a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings, and
(b) the evidence provided by the statement is so unconvincing that, considering its
importance to the case against the defendant, his conviction of the offence would be
unsafe, the court must either direct the jury to acquit the defendant of the offence or
[dismiss the jury and order a retrial].") (emphasis added).
138. Id. § 126.
139. See id. § 126(2)(a). The latter act provides that a court may exclude prosecution
evidence "if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including
the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence
would have such an adverse affect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court
ought not to admit it." Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 c. 60 § 78 (Eng.).
140. See infra Part IV.E; see also Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26766/05,
49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, T1 41-43, at 17 (2009) (finding the reading of depositions into the
trial record under the CJA 2003, when there has been no opportunity for cross-examina-
tion, violates Article 6(3)(d) in the absence of sufficient counter-balancing measures).
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However, recently, in R. v. Horncastle'4 ' it was held that application of the
CJA 2003 did not violate the ECHR in the circumstances of that case.
Horncastle involved joint appeals concerning the admission of state-
ments of absent witnesses pursuant to the CJA 2003.142 In one instance, a
statement was provided to the police by a declarant who subsequently died
before trial. In the second, a statement was provided to the police by a
declarant who later refused to testify out of fear for her life.
In dismissing the appeals, the Court held that insofar as the provisions
of the CJA 2003 were concerned, Article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR is satisfied,
even where a conviction rests solely or to a decisive degree on hearsay evi-
dence. 14 3 The decision, which examined the CJA 2003 in view of the
recently decided European Court case of AI-Khawaja v. United Kingdom,14 4
effectively defended the legislative propriety of restricting confrontation
rights in certain circumstances.
The Court in Horncastle found no justification in the jurisprudence of
the European Court for limiting the scope of hearsay otherwise admissible
under the CJA 2003.145 Analyzing the European Court's jurisprudence, it
concluded that "[wjhere the hearsay evidence is demonstrably reliable, or
its reliability can properly be tested and assessed, the rights of the defence
are respected, there are in the language of the [European Court] sufficient
counterbalancing measures, and the trial is fair."1 46 The Court assessed
Article 6 as requiring that a trial be fair but also noted that despite its
content, "[Article] 6(3)(d) does not create any absolute right in an accused
to have every witness against him present to be examined.' 1 4 7 The Court
thus found that the statements admitted pursuant to CJA 2003, as applied,
were consistent with the rights provided for under the Convention. 148
Accordingly, the U.K. Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the
appeals from the judgment of the Court of Appeals on December 9,
2009.149 In particular, the Court noted that the provisions of the CJA 2003
"strike the right balance between the imperative that a trial must be fair
and the interests of victims ... and society . . . that a criminal should not
141. R. v. Horncastle, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 964, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, 1 79, at 42
(appeal taken from Eng.), aff'd, [20091 UKSC 14, [20101 2 W.L.R. 47.
142. Id. c 2, at 15.
143. Id. ' 79, at 42; but see Al-Khawaja, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, c1 41-43, at 17 (finding
a breach of ECHR, art. 6(3)(d) in respect of statements admitted pursuant to CJA 2003).
144. App. No. 26766/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2009).
145. See Horncastle, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 964, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, 1 79, at 42.
146. Id.
147. Id. 91 80, at 42.
148. Id. 91 81, at 42.
149. See generally R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, 9l 14, at 97
(appeal taken from Eng.) (noting, inter alia, that "[tihe regime enacted by Parliament
[i.e., CJA 2003] contains safeguards that render the sole or decisive rule unnecessary...
[the European Court's] jurisprudence lacks clarity . .. land] was introduced into the
Strasbourg jurisprudence without discussion of the principle underlying it or full con-
sideration of whether there was justification for imposing the rule as an overriding prin-
ciple applicable equally to the continental and common law jurisdictions... AI-Khawaja
does not establish that it is necessary to apply the sole or decisive rule in this
jurisdiction.").
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be immune from conviction where a witness... dies or cannot be called to
give evidence for some other reason."150
2. Witness Anonymity
The use of anonymous evidence at trial was squarely addressed by the
House of Lords in R. v. Davis, a 2008 decision. 15 1 The Court in Davis
acknowledged long-standing exceptions to the right of confrontation and,
importantly, reaffirmed the well-recognized historical underpinnings of
confrontation at common law,15 2 which, in England, traditionally held
that a conviction based upon the testimony of an anonymous witness is
fundamentally unfair. 15 3
In Davis, the accused's conviction for a double murder was overturned
on appeal. 154 The trial evidence consisted of seven witnesses who
expressed concerns for their physical safety. 15 5 They were each allowed to
testify with protective measures that concealed information that might have
revealed their identities from the accused and his attorneys. These mea-
sures included the use of pseudonyms; withholding from both counsel and
the accused certain identifying particulars or pedigree information, includ-
ing the witnesses' names and addresses; restricting the scope of cross-
examination such that questions on any matter which might bear on the
witnesses' identification were not permitted; the concealment of the wit-
nesses' physical appearance through the use of screens; and the use of
mechanical voice distortion devices.15 6
Of the seven witnesses against the accused, three identified him as the
shooter.15 7 The accused contended that compelling grounds existed to
question the veracity of the identifying witnesses and that their credibility
was in fact central to the case.1 58 He further argued that the restrictions
imposed by the trial court completely deprived him of the ability to chal-
lenge their evidence and, consequently, his right to a fair trial. 15 9 In agree-
ing with this position, Lord Justice Mance observed that "[iln many cases,
particularly cases where credibility is in issue, identification will be essen-
tial to effective cross-examination."'160
Although the Davis Court noted that the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court did not recognize an absolute rule prohibiting anonymous wit-
150. Id. 108, at 124.
151. R v. Davis, 12008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128 (appeal taken from Eng.).
152. See id. 5, at 1137-38 (recognizing several authorities supporting the notion of
the right to confrontation as of at least the 18th century).
153. See id. 9 25, at 1147.
154. Id. 1 35, at 1150.
155. Id. 91 3 at 1137.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. 1 4, at 1137.
159. Id. 91 32 at 1148-49 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting the accused's assertion
that the protective measures gravely impeded him from pursuing the suggestion that
certain evidence had been procured by a former girlfriend).
160. Id. 91 72, at 1162 (emphasis added).
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nesses, 16 1 it also observed that fair trial rights-specifically the right to
examine-may be violated if there are no counterbalancing procedures, or
if a conviction is based wholly or to a decisive extent on anonymous evi-
dence. 162 Similarly, the court found that in circumstances where the
appellant could not have been convicted but for the anonymously received
evidence, the trial is rendered unfair and, therefore, unlawful. 16 3 The court
declined to expand the authority of English courts to allow the use of anon-
ymous evidence in criminal trials beyond the extremely limited circum-
stances provided for at common law, particularly in the absence of a
regulatory regime. 164 The Court thus deferred to Parliament to act to
"devise an appropriate system which still ensures a fair trial."1 6 5
This invitation was met with almost instantaneous legislative reform
"to put on a statutory footing a power for the courts to grant witnesses
anonymity orders in criminal proceedings where this is consistent with the
right of a defendant to a fair trial."16 6 The resultant Criminal Evidence
(Witness Anonymity) Act of 200816 7 -modeled on the New Zealand Evi-
dence Act of 200616 8 -now authorizes English courts to issue witness ano-
nymity orders under relatively narrowly defined conditions, abolishing the
common law limitations on the power of courts to do so.' 6 9 Of course, to
the extent that Davis did not altogether rule out the admissibility of anony-
mous testimony in English courts, the Witness Anonymity Act can be
viewed as a mere codification of the case.
161. Id. 1 82-83, at 1166-67.
162. Id. cl 77-80, at 1164-66 (discussing Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-Il Eur.
Ct. H.R. 446, 70, at 470 (providing that the accused's interests are also to be balanced
"against those of witnesses or victims called to testify.")); see also Van Mechelen v. The
Netherlands, 1997-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, 53, at 711 (quoting Doorson) (requiring the
application of counter-balancing procedures).
163. R. v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128 96, at 1172 (appeal taken
from Eng.)
164. Id. 98, at 1172-73 (stating that "any further relaxation of the basic common
law rule, requiring witnesses on issues in dispute to be identified and cross-examined
with knowledge of their identity and permitting the defence to know and put to wit-
nesses otherwise admissible and relevant questions about their identity, is one for Parlia-
ment to endorse and delimit and not for the courts to create.").
165. Id. 1 45, at 1153.
166. Press Release, United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, Criminal Evidence (Witness
Anonymity) Act 2008 (July 2, 2008) (specifically referring to the Davis judgment), http:/
/www.justice.gov.uk/publications/witness-anonymity-bill.htm; see also David Howarth,
The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, ARcHBOLD NEWS Sept. 9, 2008, at 6-
7.
167. See Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act, 2008, c. 15 (Eng.) [hereinafter
Witness Anonymity Act].
168. See Andrew Ashworth, Witness: Trial Judge Granting Anonymity to Witnesses-
Whether Lawful Under Common Law and Strasbourg Jurisprudence, 11 Cam. L.R. 915,
919 (2008) (observing that Sections 110-118 of the 2006 New Zealand Evidence Act
abolishes the common law and instates discretionary court ordered anonymity in its
place).
169. See Witness Anonymity Act, supra note 167, § 1(1)-(2); see also Press Circular,
United Kingdom Ministry of Justice Circular, Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity)
Act 2008 (july 21, 2008), http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/criminal-evidence-act.pdf.
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Nevertheless, the Act aspires to provide courts with a structured ana-
lytical and practical framework in which to determine the propriety and
administration of anonymity orders. As mentioned above, § 1 of the Wit-
ness Anonymity Act supplants the common law limitations in respect of
ordering witness anonymity. 170 § 2 authorizes the court to employ appro-
priate and "specified measures" against the disclosure of witnesses' identi-
ties such as, withholding names and other details; the use of pseudonyms;
interdicting the scope of examination so as to prohibit questions that might
lead to the identification of a witness; using screens to obscure witness'
physical identification; and the use of voice modulation. 17 1 § 3 addresses
the implementation of the procedures to be followed upon application of
either the prosecution or defense for an anonymity order. 172 Further, § 4
establishes three predicate conditions for the issuance of these orders.
17 3
Finally, § 5 requires that the court take account of several non-exhaustive
"relevant considerations," principally concerning the administration of a
fair trial, as follows:
a) the general right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to know the
identity of a witness in the proceedings;
b) the extent to which the credibility of the witness concerned would be a
relevant factor when the weight of his or her evidence comes to be
assessed;
c) whether evidence given by the witness might be the sole or decisive evi-
dence implicating the defendant;
d) whether the witness's evidence could be properly tested (whether on
grounds of credibility or otherwise) without his or her identity being
disclosed;
e) whether there is any reason to believe that the witness-
i. has a tendency to be dishonest, or
ii. has any motive to be dishonest in the circumstances of the case, hav-
ing regard (in particular) to any previous convictions of the witness
and to any relationship between the witness and the defendant or any
associates of the defendant;
f) whether it would be reasonably practicable to protect the witness's iden-
tity by any means other than by making a witness anonymity order speci-
fying the measures that are under consideration by the court.
1 74
Similarly to the CJA 2003, these factors do not necessarily curtail the
courts' authority to issue anonymity orders even if the resulting conviction
would rest on anonymous evidence to a 'decisive' extent.1 75 Thus, it is
170. See Witness Anonymity Act, supra note 167, § 1(2).
171. Id. § 2(2)(a)-(e).
172. See id. § 3(1).
173. See id. § 4(1)-(5) (providing that (a) the measures specified in a witness ano-
nymity order be necessary to protect the safety of the witness or another person or to
prevent serious damage to property, or harm to the public interest; (b) that the court
take into account the impact of such an order upon the fairness of the trial proceedings;
and (c) that the court must find the order necessary to secure the testimony of the wit-
ness, which it must also find to be necessary to the proceedings).
174. Id. § 5(1)-(2).
175. See, e.g., R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, 56, at 680
(appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that there is no mandatory rule against the use of
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quite likely that a conflict with the EHCR will arise at some point concern-
ing its application.
D. Diversity in the Common Law Approach to Confrontation
English law does not share the U.S. view that confrontation is a virtu-
ally categorical imperative and thus admits of no equivalent protection of
the right. 1 7 6 The CJA 2003, Witness Anonymity Act, and most recently the
Horncastle case underscore this divide in the Anglo-American tradition.
Indeed, the principally deontological approach taken in the United States-
one in which confrontation is intrinsically valued, even where a fair trial is
otherwise obtainable-is arguably sui generis. Conversely, to the extent the
current English statutory framework more directly defines the right of con-
frontation and cross-examination relative to other competing factors affect-
ing the overarching fairness of trial proceedings (including those that do
not necessarily involve the conduct of the accused) it is consonant with a
broad-based teleological perspective, which has been adopted to varying
degrees by other Adversarial jurisdictions and the European Court.
As mentioned above, New Zealand's 2006 Evidence Act informs cur-
rent English legislation concerning witness anonymity. 177 Thus, although
New Zealand considers the right to confrontation "basic to any civilized
notion of a fair trial,"178 that right has also been regularly limited in view
of competing social interests and is not generally perceived of as unquali-
fied, as it is in the U.S. 179
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, °8 0 which does not
expressly provide for the right of confrontation, similarly qualifies it.
Although § 7 of the Charter implicitly guarantees confrontation as part of
anonymous evidence to form the basis of a conviction, whether solely or to a decisive
extent); see also J.R. Spencer, Hearsay Reform: The Train Hits the Buffers at Strasbourg, 68
CAMBRIDGE. L.J. 258, 259 (2009) (observing that "the 2003 reform works on the premise
that if a piece of hearsay evidence is admissible it has the same potential weight as a
piece of oral evidence, and it is open to the court to convict on it, even if it stands
alone.").
176. See, e.g., Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, 1 42, at 63-64; see
also R. v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128, 1 68-71, at 1160-1162 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (providing that "the right to confrontation recognised in the United
States has ... no exact counterpart in English common law.").
177. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
178. R. v. Hughes, [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 129, 148 (C.A.); see also Bill of Rights Act 1990,
1990 S.N.Z. No. 109, §25(0 (providing for the right to examine in the language of the
ICCPR and other international instruments) [hereinafter BORA].
179. Marie Dyhrberg, Barriers to Defence Access to Witnesses for the Prosecution - An
Antipodean Perspective 91 6-7, at 3(2007), http://mariedyhrberg.co.nz/showfile.php?
downloadid=410; see also R. v Hovell, 11987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 610, 613 (C.A.) (admitting the
statement of an unavailable elderly rape victim on the basis that "cross-examination
would have been very unlikely to have made any difference" due to the extremely general
nature of the witness's description of the assailant).
180. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter, Canadian
Charter].
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the overall fairness of trial proceedings, 18 1 "the right to confront unavaila-
ble witnesses at trial is neither an established nor a basic principle of fun-
damental justice." 182 In this respect, Canadian jurisprudence recognizes
the right to confrontation as one qualified "in the interests of justice."'183
Thus, while Adversarial systems may hold certain positions fundamentally
diverse from those espoused in the Continental tradition, the substantive
application of the right of confrontation is not necessarily one of them. 18 4
Both the UNHRC and European Court take a similarly broad teleologi-
cal approach to confrontation-that is, the relative right of the defense to
participate in the examination of witnesses is balanced against the rights of
witnesses and alleged victims, including their privacy rights. 18 5 However,
this approach has drawn pointed criticism from some commentators who
argue that it has "little predictive value."' 81 6 Nevertheless, the notional
requirement of 'corroboration,' which is manifested in the prohibition of
courts from giving "considerable weight" to or basing a decision to convict
to a "decisive extent" on the out-of-court statements of unavailable wit-
nesses18 7 -especially in the absence of an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination18 8 -represents a critical step toward an international recogni-
181. See R. v. Potvin, [19891 i S.C.R. 525, 542. The Canadian Charter provides the
right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or security of the person without the observance
of the principles of fundamental justice. See Canadian Charter § 1(7).
182. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 542 (noting that "the right asserted by the appellant to
confront an unavailable witness before the trier of fact at trial cannot be said to be a
traditional or basic tenet of our justice system.") (emphasis added); see also R. v. L.
(D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 459-60 (confirming that, "contemporaneous cross-exami-
nation [is] not protected by the Charter.").
183. See R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, 491 (internal citations omitted); cf. R.
v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, 1003 (stating that "[it is axiomatic that an accused has the
right to confront all witnesses and to be meaningfully present while evidence is being
adduced, be it for or against the accused.") (emphasis added).
184. See generally R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, 1 41, at 104
(appeal taken from Eng.) (recognizing the teleological approach to confrontation taken
by a number of Common Law States to confrontation and noting that "under the com-
mon law and statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule recognized in [Canada, Australia
and New Zealand] there is no rigid rule excluding evidence if it is or would be either the
'sole' or 'decisive' evidence, however those words may be understood or applied. Instead,
the common law and legislature in these countries have, on a principled basis, carefully
developed and defined conditions under which hearsay evidence may be admitted, in the
interests of justice and on a basis ensuring that defendants receive a fair trial.") (empha-
sis added).
185. See generally Grant v. The Queen, [2006] UKPC 2, [2007] 1 A.C. 1, 17, at 13
(internal citations omitted) (observing that the European Court "has recognized the
need for a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the personal
rights of the individual, and has described the search for that balance as inherent in the
whole Convention... [and that] the rights of the individual must be safeguarded, but the
interests of the community and the victims of crime must also be respected.").
186. Andrew Choo, Crawford v. Washington: A View from Across the Atlantic, 2 INT'L
COMMENT. EVIDENCE 4, 9 (2004).
187. Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, 9 76, at 272 (noting that
a conviction should not be based either solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous
statements."); see also Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-IlI Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, 1
55, at 712 (same).
188. Dugin v. Russian Federation, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
815/1998, at 9 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/815/1998 (2004).
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tion of the intrinsic and independent value of the right to examine. As
discussed below, however, international recognition of the right in substan-
tive terms does not yet go far enough.
III. Confrontation under the ICCPR
A. Background
With near universal acceptance, 18 9 the ICCPR-one of the archetypal
international instruments articulating fair trial standards-continues to
influence the development of modern international criminal law and pro-
cedure as it has done for more than 30 years since its entry in to force. 190
Together with its two Optional Protocols, the ICCPR firmly establishes not
only minimum procedural guarantees to which an accused is entitled as a
matter of international human rights law, but also the binding, individu-
ally enforceable nature of those guarantees relative to member States.191
The ICCPR emerged as a product of the failure of United Nations
member states to reach a consensus on making the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) binding. 192 The original text of the UDHR
incorporated both first generation civil and political rights (supported
predominantly by western and westernized states) as well as second-gener-
ation economic and social rights (favored by communist-bloc nations). 19 3
The complexities involved in reaching agreement on implementation and
enforceability led to the creation of two covenants1 94 -the ICCPR on one
189. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL at 204, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E09.V.3 (2009) (indicating 164 parties and sev-
enty-two signatories to the ICCPR).
190. The ICCPR was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on 16 December 1966, and entered into force on 23 March 1976. See S. COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) [hereinafter
Senate ICCPR Report].
191. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.
1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
192. See THOMAS G. WEISS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (AND HOW TO
Fix IT) 63, (Polity Press 2008); see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, (Dec. 12, 1948). As a decla-
ration, the UDHR is not legally binding. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 151 (2d ed. 2000). However, because many of the
rights in the UDHR have become so widely observed as binding law, they have become a
recognized part of customary international law.
193. See Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1997) (noting that the segmentation of the UDHR into 'first'
and 'second' generation rights "reflect[ed] the contrasting interests of the Cold War divi-
sion between West and East.").
194. See Christian TOMUSCHAT, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS (United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 2008), http://un
treaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/iccpr/iccpre.pdf (noting that "by resolution 543 (VI) of 4
February 1952, the General Assembly directed the Commission on Human Rights to
prepare, instead of just one Covenant, two draft treaties; a Covenant setting forth civil
and political rights and a parallel Covenant providing for economic, social and cultural
rights."). For an excellent discussion of the reasons underpinning resolution 543 (VI),
the so-called "separation" resolution see Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeabil-
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hand, and on the other the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 195 While the ICESCR attends, inter alia, to
working conditions, adequate living standards (including shelter and
food), health, and education, 196 the ICCPR "guarantees a broad spectrum
of civil and political rights,"19 7 including the right to self-determination,
the right to life, freedom of religion and speech, and equal protection under
the law. 198
B. Fair Trial Provisions
The ICCPR also broadly defines a number of customary and treaty-
based rights, setting out core principles universally attendant to the fair
administration of criminal proceedings. 19 9 Article 14 requires that in
every phase of the trial process the parties should be considered procedur-
ally equal and thus be placed in an equsal position to advance their respec-
tive cases.200 The Covenant therefore recognizes the principle of 'equality
of arms' as an essential tenet in the administration of fair trials. 20 1 In
criminal cases, this denotes a state of procedural parity between the prose-
cution and the defense, 20 2 often loosely analogized to the common law
notion of due process. 20
3
ity of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on
Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 769, 779-98 (1989).
195. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter, ICESCRI; see also G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) (resolution adopting the ICESCR); WEISS, supra note 192, at 63-64;
see also Fact Sheet, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights, No. 2 (Rev. 1) 2, (June 1996), http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/479477480.html (noting that "the General Assembly requested the
Commission "to draft two Covenants on Human Rights ... one to contain civil and
political rights and the other to contain economic, social and cultural rights.").
196. ICESCR, supra note 195, arts. 7, 11-13.
197. Senate ICCPR Report, supra note 190.
198. ICCPR, supra note 3, arts. 1, 6, 18, and 26.
199. See Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (2001); see also Anne E. Joynt, The Semantics of the Guantanamo
Bay Inmates: Enemy Combatants or Prisoners of the War on Terror?, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 427, 437 (2004).
200. See Ofner and Hopfinger v. Austria, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Cony. H.R. 680, 696 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.); see also Bulut v. Austria, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 346, 47, at 359
(explaining equality of arms as "one of the features of the wider concept of a fair trial"
under which "each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case
under conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-i-vis his opponent.").
201. See Campbell v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 307/
1988, at 11 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/307/1988 (1993) (observing that "an indis-
pensable aspect of the fair trial principle is the equality of arms between the prosecution
and the defence."); Morael v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
207/1986, 1 9.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 210 (1989) (noting that a fair
hearing under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR must at a minimum include, inter alia, equal-
ity of arms); see also Robinson v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication
No. 223/1987, 91 10.4, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 241 (1989).
202. See B. d. B. et al. v. Netherlands, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication
No. 273/1989, ' 6.4, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 286 (1989) (observing that
Article 14 "guarantees procedural equality.").
203. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 278.
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This widely accepted principle20 4 informs Article 14's fair trial provi-
sions,20 5 which include the right to equality before the courts as well as the
right to a fair and public hearing,20 6 the presumption of innocence, the
right to be informed of charges, the right to have adequate time to prepare a
defense and to communicate with counsel, the right to be tried without
undue delay, the right to counsel, and free legal assistance if necessary,
20 7
the right to the assistance of an interpreter, the right not to be compelled to
testify against oneself or to confess guilt,20 8 and of course, the right to
examine the witnesses.
20 9
As international human rights instruments have increasingly tended
towards a preference for adversarial criminal procedures, 2 10 the right to
equality of arms within the framework of the common law due process
model has gained correlative favor and importance, in particular within
Continental systems. 2 11 The result is an increasing convergence of the pro-
204. Id. at 277 (noting "the right to equality of arms is guaranteed in ... the ICCPR,
the A[ ]CHR, and the Fundamental Freedoms."). It is also substantively protected in the
ACHR and the ACHPR Resolution; see Avocats Sans Frontieres (on behalf of
Bwampamye) v. Burundi, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Commu-
nication No. 231/99 (2000), 191 26-27, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
africa/comcases/231-99.html.
205. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 277.
206. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14(1); see also G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (U.N. resolution adopting the ICCPR).
207. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14(1).
208. Id. art. 14(2), 14(3), 14(b)-(d), 14(f)-(g).
209. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
210. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 277; see also Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra,
Assisting an Accused to Represent Himsel. Appointment of Amici Curiae as the Most Appro-
priate Option, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 47, 49 (2006) (observing that "[i]nternational crimi-
nal procedure can be perceived as a mixture of common law and civil law concepts, in
which common law elements prevail.").
211. For example, in 1989 and 2001 Italy underwent a near total reform of its crimi-
nal procedure, and substantially adopted several adversarial features. See Pizzi &
Marafioti, supra note 50, at 5-6 (observing that Italy's decision to adopt an adversarial
trial system reflects in part "a way to 'open up' its criminal justice system, both to reflect
its status as a modern democratic society and to make a dramatic break with past reli-
ance on closed pretrial hearings."); see also Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 32, at 431
(noting that the 2001 reformation of the Italian code of criminal procedure extends
greater adversarial rights to defendants, pursuant to a 1999 Parliamentary reform of the
Italian Constitution, "to mandate an adversarial trial system by strengthening the rights
of defendants, especially the rights that guarantee defendants the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against them," which itself followed several judicial decisions
undercutting basic principles ushered in with the 1989 transformation). Although not
nearly as radical a reform of continental procedure as the Italian initiative, French crimi-
nal procedure underwent similar changes in 2000, strengthening the defense right to
request a juge d'instruction to examine witnesses and to seek additional evidence. These
reforms allowed a right of appeal where the refusal of the judge to carry out such
requests was unjustified. See generally Stewart Field & Andrew West, Dialogue and the
Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process, 14 CRiM.
L. F. 261 (2003). German criminal procedure provides for the right of the defense to
"make oral requests of proof which generally oblige the court to hear additional evi-
dence as suggested by the party. The court can refuse a request of proof only for one of
several fairly limited reasons." See Frase & Weigend, supra note 20, at 342 (internal
citations omitted).
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cedural and substantive conceptions of a fair trial across the two systems.
C. The Right to Examine Adverse Witnesses
The UNHRC is responsible for monitoring and interpreting the
ICCPR.2 12 It is authorized to consider allegations from individuals in
member States with regard to violations of their civil and political rights
under the first of its two Optional Protocols. 2 13 Although it has not defini-
tively interpreted the right to examine witnesses as being inclusive of the
right to direct confrontation,2 14 the UNHRC has observed that Article
14(3)(e) was "designed to guarantee the accused the same legal powers of
. ..examining or cross-examining any witnesses as are available to the
prosecution. '2 15 Although the right of direct confrontation is not
expressly provided for under the ICCPR, the characterization of the princi-
ple of equality of arms internationally could in theory support such a
view.2 16
The fact that Article 14 confers only a general right to examine rather
than a more explicit right to adversarial confrontation likely owes to its
universalistic underpinnings in taking into consideration broadly divergent
national legal systems. 2 17 As a minimum guarantee however, a general
212. See Fact Sheet, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, No. 15
(Rev. 1) 14, Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, http://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Publications/FactSheetl 5rev. len.pdf.
213. The first of two optional protocols to the ICCPR sets forth the terms and proce-
dure under which the UNHRC receives and considers 'communications' (submitted
complaints). See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force March 23, 1976). The sec-
ond optional protocol to the ICCPR is directed at abolishing the imposition of capital
punishment. See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M.
1464 (entered into force July 11, 1991).
214. See generally Sherman, supra note 20, at 855 (arguing that one of the reasons the
ICCPR is silent on the issue of direct confrontation is its intended establishment of
minimum core rights to applied to a broad spectrum of legal systems).
215. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., General Comment 13: Article 14 (Administration of
Justice) Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Inde-
pendent Court Established by Law, 9 12 reprinted in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 135
(Apr. 13, 1984) [hereinafter General Comment 13]; see also Compass v. Jamaica, U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 375/1989, '1 10.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/
D/375/1989 (1993) (noting that "article 14, paragraph 3(e), protects the equality of
arms between the prosecution and the defence in the examination of witnesses.").
216. See, e.g., Mitrevski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No.
33046/02, 28, June 21, 2007 (recognizing that in civil trials each party must be pro-
vided with an opportunity to defend its interests "under conditions which do not place
him at a substantial disadvantage vis-A-vis his opponent.") (emphasis added), http://
www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/515.html; Kaufman v. Belgium, 50 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 98, 115 (1986); cf. Foucher v. France, 1997-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 452, 9 34,
at 465 (lacking the substantiality requirement).
217. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FAIR TIALS MANuAL, 129 (Amnesty International
1998) (noting that "[tihe wording of international standards, which use the phrase 'to
examine or have examined', takes into account different legal systems, including systems
based on adversarial trials and systems where the judicial authorities examine wit-
nesses.") (internal citation omitted), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/interna-
tional_justice/fair-trials/manual/22.html.
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right to examine may not preserve the fairness of the proceedings. 2 18
Thus, where it is necessary to achieve the overarching substantive fairness
contemplated under the ICCPR, it seems obvious that the Covenant's text
may, indeed should, be construed to require additional procedural safe-
guards and guarantees. While member states may not deviate from the
minimal protections provided under the ICCPR, they are always free to
exceed them. As such, the absence of a textual reference to a right of adver-
sarial confrontation per se cannot be read to deny the extension of such a
right as necessary to secure a fair trial. 2 19 Indeed, respect for the principle
of adversarial proceedings is central to the notion of a fair trial, as inter-
preted by the UNHRC. 220
D. The Jurisprudence (Views) of the UN Human Rights Committee
Notwithstanding the definition of 'examine' as might be required
under Article 14(3)(e), it is clear that it at least requires "that the parties
participate ... in an adversarial procedure and that ... defence counsel
ha[s] the opportunity to interrogate [adverse witnesses]." 22 1 The UNHRC
has observed that, to preserve the rights conferred by Article 14(3)(e),
criminal proceedings "must provide the person charged with the criminal
offence the right to an oral hearing, at which he or she may appear in
person or be represented by counsel, and may bring evidence and examine
the witnesses." 22 2 Moreover, this right may encompasses preliminary pro-
ceedings at which witness testimony is received where the witness is subse-
quently unavailable at trial. 223
Perhaps the most transparent violations of the right to examine have
been found in the context of proceedings before so-called faceless
courts. 2 24 These proceedings are marked by the concealment of the iden-
218. See General Comment 13, supra note 215, 1 5 (noting that "the requirements of
paragraph 3 are minimum guarantees, the observance of which is not always sufficient
to ensure the fairness of a hearing as required by paragraph 1.").
219. See Sherman, supra note 20, at 856 (noting that the ICCPR's silence on the ques-
tion of a right to confront "cannot be the basis for any argument that defendants need
not, or should not, be accorded [such a] right.").
220. Morael v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 207/1986,'1
9.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 210 (1989) (observing that "the concept of a
fair hearing in the context of article 14 (1) of the Covenant should be interpreted as
requiring a number of conditions, such as equality of arms, respect for the principle of
adversary proceedings ... ").
221. Semey v. Spain, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 986/2001,
8.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/986/2001 (2003).
222. Rodriguez Orejuela v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication
No. 848/1999, 17.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. 40 (A/57/40) at 172 (2002) (holding that because
of the absence of an adversarial hearing, affording the accused an opportunity to
examine witnesses, "the proceedings... culminated in... conviction and sentencing
[that violated] the right of the [accused] to a fair trial in accordance with article 14 of the
Covenant.").
223. See generally Compass v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication
No. 375/1989, 9 10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/375/1989 (1993).
224. See, e.g., Vargas MAs v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
1058/2002, 1 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1058/2002 (2005); Quispe Roque v. Peru,
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1125/2002, 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
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tity of the judges and the inability of the defense to challenge them.225
They are typically conducted in a manner that systematically deprives the
defense of any ability to examine adversarial witnesses, 2 26 and in some
instances of the right to be present at the proceedings or the right to a
public trial.2 27 Similarly, the UNHRC has determined that in the absence
of due notice, trials in absentia also violate the right of the accused not only
to be present but also of the right to examine witnesses altogether. 228
1. Fairness in the Examination of Witnesses
UNHRC jurisprudence suggests that the right to examine arguably
requires a component of effectiveness. For example, in Peart v. Jamaica,2 29
a murder trial, it became known during the cross-examination of the prin-
cipal eye-witness that he had made a prior written statement to the police
on the night of the incident. The accused requested a copy of the prior
statement, which was refused by the prosecution and denied by the trial
C/85/D/1125/2002 (2005); Carranza Alegre v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Com-
munication No. 1126/2002, cl 7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002 (2005).
225. See Carranza Alegre, Communication No. 1126/2002,1 3.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
85/D/1126/2002; see also Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report
1996, at 736, OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.95 Doc. 7 rev., (Mar. 14, 1997) (observing that "[k]eeping
secret the identity of the 'faceless' judges and prosecutors prevents them from guarantee-
ing the independence and impartiality of the courts. The anonymity of the judges
deprives the defendant of the basic guarantees of justice.").
226. See, e.g., Vargas Mas, Communication No. 1058/2002, 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/85/D/1058/2002 (noting that Article 14 is violated in the absence of an opportunity
to question witnesses, where the attorney for the accused received threats and the pro-
ceedings were conducted by faceless judges); Quispe Roque, Communication No. 1125/
2002, 1 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1125/2002 (finding an Article 14 violation
where the "court [was] composed of faceless judges[,] the interrogation of witnesses was
not permitted and [defense attorney] had only 30 minutes to examine the case file.");
Carranza Alegre, Communication No. 1126/2002, cl 7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/
1126/2002, para. 7.5 (determining that defense counsel's inability "to challenge wit-
nesses who had made statements during the police investigation" contributed to the
denial of a fair trial as a whole).
227. See U.N. HuMAN RIGHTS COMM., General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to
Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 23, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32
(Aug. 23, 2007) (noting that trials involving anonymous judges, such as those involving
measures taken to fight terrorist activities, suffer from other basic irregularities);
Becerra Barney v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1298/
2004, 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1298/2004 (2006) (excluding the accused from
the proceedings); Vivanco v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
678/1996, 7.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/678/1996 (2002) (denying the right to com-
municate with chosen lawyer); Quispe Roque, Communication No. 1125/2002, 17.3,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1125/2002 (imposing severe restrictions on the accused's
right to examine or even cross-examine certain classes of witnesses, e.g., police officers
responsible for the arrest and interrogation of the defendant).
228. See Mbenge v. Zaire, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 16/1977,
91 14.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 76 (1990) (noting that without due notification,
judgements in absentia violate Article 14(3)(e)); see also Antonaccio v. Uruguay, U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. R.14/63, 91 20, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/
37/40) at 114 (1982) (same).
229. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communications Nos. 464/1991 & 482/1991,
U.N. Docs. CCPR/C/54/D/464/1991 & 482/1991 (1995).
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judge.230 As it turned out, however, the accused finally received a copy of
the statement following their conviction and appeal. 231 The statement
named another individual as having shot the decedent. In holding that
Article 14(3)(e) had been violated, the UNHRC determined that the "fail-
ure to make the police statement of the witness available to the defence
seriously obstructed the defence in its cross-examination of the witness,
thereby precluding a fair trial of the defendant. '232 The decision is signifi-
cant in this respect because it is not limited to the mere provision of an
'opportunity' to cross-examine as a means to achieve procedural fairness,
but seems to require that the opportunity so afforded be fundamentally
fair. 233
2. Absence of Counsel
In Brown v. Jamaica,234 the UNHRC determined that an accused must
be provided an opportunity to "ensure the presence of his lawyer" at a pre-
liminary hearing involving the deposition of witnesses. 235 At issue was the
propriety of allowing a preliminary hearing involving the deposition of two
prosecution witnesses to continue in the absence of the accused's attor-
ney.2 36 Initially, when the accused indicated that he preferred not to cross-
examine the witnesses himself, the magistrate adjourned the matter for
cross-examination. 237 Following a second adjournment due to the absence
of counsel, new counsel was appointed for the accused who, having never
been present for the direct testimony, declined to cross-examine the wit-
nesses.238 While the UNHRC concluded that the proceedings violated
Article 14(3)(d) in this instance, the absence of counsel at preliminary pro-
ceedings has been separately determined to be violative of Article
14(3)(e). 239 Not surprisingly, the absence of an accusatory witness from
the proceedings altogether may yield precisely the same result.
230. Id. cf 11.4.
231. Id. 1 3.1.
232. Id. ci 11.5.
233. See Yasseen and Thomas v. Guyana, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communica-
tion No. 676/1996, cf 7.10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/676/1996 (1998) (noting that the
failure to produce documents which may have contained evidence favorable evidence to
the accused at trial violates Article 14(3)(e)).
234. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 775/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/65/D/775/1997 (1999). Here, the UNHRC found that the magistrate judge's conduct
in proceeding with preliminary depositions "aware of the absence of the author's
defence counsel" violated the rights of the accused, under Article 14(3)(d), "to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance." Id. ' 6.6. The UNHRC's view, however,
has manifest implications concerning the conferral of rights under Article 14(e) in these
circumstances.
235. Id. cf 6.6.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Hendricks v. Guyana, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 838/
1998, c 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/838/1998 (2002) (finding a violation of both
Article 14(3)(d) and (e) where defense counsel was absent from a stage of the prelimi-
nary hearing); cf. Semey v. Spain, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
986/2001, 8.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/986/2001 (2003) (remarking that Article
Vol. 43
2010 Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation545
3. Absence of Accusatory Witness
In Dugin v. Russian Federation2 40 the accused and his accomplice were
charged with murder in a beating death. The decedent and his companion
confronted the accused and his accomplice, resulting in a fight. 24 1 Based
upon the testimony of several eyewitnesses and that of the surviving victim,
the accused was convicted of premeditated murder. 24 2 The surviving vic-
tim, however, never appeared during trial and his absence thus precluded
cross-examination. 24 3 Nonetheless, the trial court considered the pretrial
statements made by the surviving victim during the course of the initial
investigation. 24 4 Concluding that the rights of the accused under Article
14 had been violated, the UNHRC questioned the circumstances concern-
ing the victim's unavailability, noting that the reasons for his absence at
trial had not been adequately explained; moreover, the UNHRC observed
that the trial court had given "very considerable weight... to his statement,
although the author was unable to cross-examine this witness."2 45
Similarly, in Rouse v. The Philippines,24 6 the basis of the witness's
unavailability was stressed in determining whether there was a violation of
the right to examine witnesses. In Rouse, having been charged with violat-
ing a child abuse statute, the accused asserted that he had been framed by
the police.24 7 His trial and subsequent conviction were primarily based
upon the signed and sworn statement of the 15-year-old victim, which was
witnessed by his parents.248 The statement alleged that the accused had
prompted the victim to engage in sexual acts.24 9 On the facts of the case,
the UNHRC found a violation of Article 14(3)(e). 25 0 First, although the
alleged victim had been subpoenaed to testify, neither he nor his parents
could be located.2 51 Secondly, "considerable weight was given to that wit-
ness' out of court statement" as the sole eyewitness to the alleged crime
which the accused had not been able to cross-examine. 25 2
Determining the fairness of trial proceedings in the face of statements
not subjected to cross-examination, in terms of the degree of reliance
placed upon such evidence in sustaining a conviction, has gained favor in
14(3)(e) is satisfied where the parties participated in an adversarial procedure and
defense counsel had an opportunity to interrogate the declarant).
240. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 815/1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
81/D/815/1998 (2004).
241. Id. 2.1.
242. Id. 9 2.2.
243. Id. ( 3.1.
244. Id.
245. Id. 9.3 (emphasis added). A "considerable weight" standard affords broader
protection of the right to examine than the "decisive extent" standard, applied under the
ECHR. See infra, Part IV.
246. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1089/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/84/D/1089/2002 (2005).
247. Id. 2.2.
248. Id. 9 2.4
249. Id.
250. Id. 9 7.5.
251. Id.
252. Id. (emphasis added).
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international criminal procedure.2 "3 As can be seen in the development of
the jurisprudence of the European Court discussed below, it has become a
threshold consideration to adjudicating the safety of trial proceedings and
in securing the right of examination and/or confrontation.
IV. The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950
A. Background
Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ECHR was
drawn up in 1949 by the Council of Europe. 25 4 It was opened for signa-
ture on November 4, 1950, and entered into force on September 3,
1953.255 Like the ICCPR, the European Convention provides several fun-
damental civil and political rights and freedoms including, inter alia, the
right to a fair trial. 25 6
As a regional treaty, the ECHR created international human rights
enforcement mechanisms in its member states, permitting both the adjudi-
cation of alleged violations as well the acceptance and implementation of
253. See Prosecutor v. Prliae et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Decision on the Prosecution
Motion for Admission of a Written Statement Pursuant to Rule 92quater of the Rules
(Hasa Rizvix), 1 22 (Jan. 14, 2008) (noting that under ICTY jurisprudence "a Chamber
cannot base a conviction solely or to a decisive extent on evidence which has not been
subject to examination by both parties.") (citing Prosecutor v. Martin, Case No. IT-95-
1 1-AR73.2, Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Evidence of
Witness Milan Babic, 20 (Sept. 14 2006)); Prosecutor v. Prlix et al, IT-04-74-AR73.6,
Decision on the Appeals Against the Decision to Admit the Trial Transcript of the Exami-
nation of Jadranko Prliae, 1 53 (Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Prlix Appeal]; see generally
Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision On Prosecution's Motion to
Add One Exhibit to its Rule 65ter List and for Admission of Evidence of Witness Matija
Boskovix Pursuant to Rule 92quater, 19, (Mar. 9, 2009); see also Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. No. STL/BD/2009/01/Rev. 1,
Rule 159 Uune 10, 2009) [hereinafter STL RPEI (expressly providing, "[a] conviction
may not be based solely, or to a decisive extent, on the statement of a witness made
pursuant to Rule 93.").
254. EUROPEAN COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS, INFORMATION DOCUMENT ON THE COURT c1 1
(2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/981B9082-45A4-44C6-829A-202A51B9
4A85/0/ENGInfodoc.pdf [hereinafter Information Document] (noting that "[t]he Con-
vention represented the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights
set out in the Universal Declaration.").
255. Id.
256. See ECHR, supra note 3, art. 6 (providing that "[i]n the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law."). Moreover, since its entry into force, the Convention's Protocols
have expanded the rights originally set out. See Protocol No. 6 to the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the
Abolition of Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1985, Eur. T.S. 114 (abolishing the death penalty);
Council of Europe, Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, Eur. T.S. 117, arts. 2-4 (providing
for the right of appeal in criminal cases; compensation of victims of miscarriages of
justice; and protection against double jeopardy); Protocol 12 to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Prohibition of Discrimina-
tion, Nov. 4, 2000, Eur. T.S. 177; Protocol 13 to the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circum-
stances, May 3, 2002, Eur. T.S. 187.
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the decisions rendered. 25 7 Although the Convention has always allowed
individuals to bring complaints directly against member states, a private
right of enforcement was originally recognized only at a State's option and
acceptance. 258 However, as of 1998 the recognition of a private right of
enforcement has been compulsory among member states. 259 As such,
"individuals now enjoy at the international level a real right of action to
assert the rights and freedoms to which they are directly entitled under the
Convention."260
Over the years, responsibility for enforcing the European Convention
has fallen to three institutions-the European Commission of Human
Rights; the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which super-
vises the enforcement of decisions;2 6 1 and the European Court.2 62 The
Convention's role among national jurisdictions has been to harmonize
rights protection by establishing a minimum standard-"a floor below
which a national legal protection may not fall." 263 While this clearly
implies a differing impact upon diverse national systems, the Convention,
in essence, constitutes an obligatory norm derived from an "emerging con-
sensus among the Contracting States."'26 4 In this sense, the jurisprudence
of the European Court has been markedly influential in developing rights-
based norms and particularly, in fostering basic consistency among the
criminal procedures of its diverse members.
257. See generally Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, 21 QUINNiPLAc L. REv. 777 (2003).
258. See Information Document, supra note 254, 111 10-11; see also European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 25, Sept. 3,
1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Old European Convention] (providing that "Itihe
Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe from any person .. .provided that the High Contracting Party against which the
complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognizes the competence of the Commission
to receive such petitions.") (emphasis added).
259. Information Document, supra note 254, 4; see also Protocol No. 11 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1,
1998, Eur. T.S. 155 (replacing Article 25 of the Old Convention with Article 34 and
providing that "[t]he Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols
thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective
exercise of this right.").
260. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 293, C9 122, at 333.
261. See ECHR, supra note 3, art. 46(2) (providing that "Itihe final judgment of the
court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers which shall supervise its
execution.").
262. See European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2008 (Council of Europe
2008), 2, at 9, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5B2847D-640D-
4A09-A70A-7AIBE66563BB/0/ANNUALREPORT_2008.pdf.
263. Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, Assessing the Impact of the E.C.H.R. on National
Legal Systems, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE E.C.H.R. ON NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS 702 (Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller eds., 2008).
264. Id.
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B. Confrontation under the European Convention
The right of confrontation within the context of the principle of equal-
ity of arms was somewhat dubious in earlier traditional Continental sys-
tems; for example, as noted above, "in earlier inquisitorial systems, defense
counsel often was not allowed to participate in the actual trial." 26 5
In stark contrast, Article 6 of the ECHR "is intended above all to secure
the interests of the defence and those of the proper administration of jus-
tice."'26 6 Moreover, the European Court has recognized that "[t]he right to
a fair trial holds so prominent a place in democratic society that there can
be no justification for interpreting Article 6 of the Convention restric-
tively." 2 67 In this context, the ECHR has greatly expanded the conception
of the right to examine as a fundamental tenet of procedural fairness in
criminal proceedings across Europe and has had an appreciable impact
upon the right, particularly as administered in Continental systems. 2 68
Nevertheless, "there is little consensus as to whether the right to examine
in fact constitutes a fundamental procedural norm that cannot be dero-
gated from in any circumstances. '26 9
Although generally worded, the application of Article 6(3)'s right to
examine has been substantially refined under the European Court's case
law in two principal areas-anonymous witnesses 2 70 and absent wit-
nesses,2 7 1 including cases that have clearly involved both of these condi-
265. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 277.
266. Acquaviva v. France, 333 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 66, at 17 (1995).
267. Moreira de Azevedo v. Portugal, 189 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) CI 66, at 16 (1990); see
Windisch v. Austria, 186 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) c1 30, at 11 (1990); see also Artico v. Italy,
37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 33, at 16 (1980); see generally Daud v. Portugal, 1998-11 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 739, 39, at 750 (applying the convention to the adequacy of state-assigned
defense counsel).
268. See Dennis P. Riordan, The Rights to a Fair Trial and to Examine Witnesses Under
the Spanish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 373, 376, 407 (1999) (noting the potential of the ECHR to move the judicial
systems of traditionally inquisitorial member states closer to the common law adver-
sarial practice, referring particularly to Barberi v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1988)).
269. Kelly Buchanan, Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An Analy-
sis of the Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON
L. REv. 609, 639 (2004); see also Grant v. The Queen, [20061 UKPC 2, [2007] 1 A.C. 1, J
17, at 13 (observing that the European Court "has been astute to avoid treating the
specific rights set out in article 6 as laying down rules from which no derogation or
deviation is possible in any circumstances."). For a full treatment of derogation under
Article 15 and European Court jurisprudence, see RALPH BEDDARD, HuMAN RIGHTS AND
EUROPE, 188-92 (3d ed. 1993).
270. See Krasniki v. The Czech Republic, App. No. 51277/99, Feb. 28, 2006, http://
www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/176.html.
271. See Craxi v. Italy (no. 1), App No. 34896/97, Dec. 5 2002 (available only in
French), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=7032
37&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C 1
166DEA398649; Ferrantelli v. Italy, 1996-IlI Eur. Ct. H.R. 937; Zentar v. France, App.
No. 17902/02, Apr. 13, 2006 (available only in French), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp
197/view.asp?action=html&documentld=794312&portal=hbkm&source=externalby
docnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649; S.N. v. Sweden, 2002-
V Eur. Ct. H.R. 145.
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tions.2 72 While anonymous and absent witnesses are dealt with below, to
the extent that vulnerable witnesses comprise a somewhat specialized class
of cases involving unique public policy issues, they are, for comparative
purposes, beyond the limited scope of this article.
1. The Right to Examine Generally
Although Article 6, like ICCPR Article 14, protects the right to a fair
hearing, it does not provide for rules on the admissibility of evidence. Arti-
cle 6(3) provides as follows:
3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights:
a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his
defence;
c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance,
to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him;
e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court.
In applying Article 6(3)(d), the Court's primary focus is not upon the
proper application of often idiosyncratic and divergent evidentiary rules
among member states as a supranational court of review, but on the funda-
mental fairness of the trial proceedings overall.2 73 National proceedings
are thus accorded a great deal of deference in respect of the regulation and
application of evidentiary rules. 2 74 Indeed, national courts have been
accorded such great deference in determining whether or not to require the
appearance of witnesses for trial that, in the view of some commentators,
Article 6(3)(d) was of little practical impact. 275 In this context, Unterpert-
inger v. Austria2 76 arose as one of the early hearsay confrontation-type
cases, etching out the contours of the right to examine under the ECHR.
In Unterpertinger, the accused was convicted of domestic assault. 2 77
272. See Ludi v. Switzerland, 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); Van Mechelen v. The
Netherlands, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 691.
273. See Schenk v. Switzerland, 140 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 46, at 29 (1988) (stating
that rules of evidence are "primarily a matter for regulation under national law."); Bar-
berA v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 68, at 31 (1988) (stating that "as a general
rule, it is for the national courts... to assess the evidence before them as well as the
relevance of the evidence .... The Court must, however, determine . . .whether the
proceedings considered as a whole, including the way in which prosecution and defence
evidence was taken, were fair as required by Article 6 § 1.").
274. See Edwards v. The United Kingdom, 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, (ser. A) 9 34, at 34-35
(1992); see also Helmers v. Sweden, 212 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 91 31, at 15 (1991).
275. Craig Osborne, Hearsay and the European Court of Human Rights, CiuM. L.R. 255,
260 (Apr. 1993).
276. 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
277. Id. 91 20, at 10.
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The accused's wife and step-daughter, the alleged victims in the case,
refused to testify against him at trial. 27 8 Consequently, the prosecution
introduced and relied on certain police reports containing their incrimina-
tory accounts of the incidents. 279 In reviewing the proceedings, the Euro-
pean Court determined that the convictions had been obtained in
contravention of the accused's rights to the extent that he was deprived of
any opportunity to cross-examine either witness concerning their state-
ments to the police. 280 Significantly, the Court noted that the statements
had been used as "proof of the truth of the accusations made by the women
at the time,"28 1 and clearly formed the basis upon which the conviction
principally rested.
In Bricmont v. Belgium28 2 the European Court established limits on the
standing policy of according deference towards the determinations of
domestic courts in respect of requiring the hearing of witnesses. In
Bricmont, the trial court excused the key witness from testifying due to his
health and age. 283 In review, the Court found that the accused's convic-
tion for forgery and misappropriation violated Article 6.284 Considering
the relationship of the principle evidence relied upon in support of a con-
viction to the question of trial fairness, the Court nonetheless recognized
that "It]here are exceptional circumstances which could prompt the Court to
conclude that the failure to hear a person as a witness was incompatible
with Article 6."285 The Court thus held that Article 6 is violated where the
evidence upon which a conviction is predicated is adduced at trial "with-
out [the accused] ever having had an opportunity, afforded by an examina-
tion or a confrontation, to have evidence taken from the complainant in his
presence. "286
Similarly, in Barbera v. Spain,28 7 a murder case that involved the pros-
ecution's use of a confession by a former accomplice of the accused, the
Court determined that the admission of a former accomplice's statements
at trial violated the accused's fair trial rights. The accused were never
afforded an opportunity to examine the absent dedarant.28 8 The Court
held that Article 6(3)'s guarantee of the right to examine "means that the
hearing of witnesses must in general be adversarial. '28 9 In principle there-
fore, all evidence must be produced in the presence of the accused with a
278. Id. 1[ 30, at 14.
279. Id. cl 31, at 14-15.
280. Id. 1 33, at 15.
281. Id.
282. 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
283. Id. cl 46, at 46.
284. Id. i 84-85, at 30-31.
285. Id. 11 89, at 31 (emphasis added). One might expect this fact to be virtually
presumed. See also Popov v. Russia, App. No. 16853/04, c1 179, July 13, 2006, http://
www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/771.html.
286. Bricmont, 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) c 8, at 30-31.
287. 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
288. Id. c 86, at 36-37.
289. Id. c 78, at 33; see also Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R.
691, cl 51, at 711.
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view to adversarial argument, and the accused "is entitled to take part in
the hearing and to have his case heard."290 In noting that "the applicants
never had an opportunity to examine a person whose evidence - which was
vital, as is clear from the Supreme Court's judgment," 29 1 the Court deter-
mined that the requirements of a fair and public hearing had been
infringed.
The assessment of the degree of centrality of statements not subjected
to cross-examination to a given conviction has become a main pillar of the
European Court's analysis of the right to examine, and one that has gained
considerable favor among other international institutions.
2 92
2. Anonymity
The European Court has posited that the use of anonymous testimony
may work unmitigated prejudice against the right of the accused to
examine the witnesses against him.29 3 In Kostovski v. The Netherlands, the
Court responded to the question of whether a conviction based upon the
unexamined statements of anonymous witnesses stood in contravention an
accused's right to a fair trial under Article 6.294 In that case, the accused
was convicted of armed robbery upon the use of statements given by two
witnesses who failed to appear at trial.2 95 The statements were received in
evidence in conformity with the established practice of The Netherlands at
the time, which permitted their use at trial upon the condition that they
had been recorded as part of the official investigative report and later read
into the trial record. 29 6 Though permitted to submit questions to the
examining magistrate to pose to the witness during the pretrial examina-
tion,29 7 counsel for the defendant was nevertheless excluded from the pro-
ceeding. Further, of the questions submitted on behalf of the accused,
only two were answered, as the remaining inquiries would allegedly have
290. Barberd, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 78, at 34 (internal citations omitted).
291. Id. 91 86, at 36-37.
292. See Prlix Appeal, supra note 253, 91 53; see also STL RPE, supra note 253, Rule
159 (expressly providing that "a conviction may not be based solely or to a decisive
extent on a statement [of an anonymous witness]."); Dugin v. Russian Federation, U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 815/1998, at 91 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/
D/815/1998 (2004) (applying a "considerable weight" standard); see also Rouse v. Phil-
ippines, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1089/2002, 91 7.5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/84/D/1089/2002 (2005) (same).
293. See Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 44-45, at 21
(1989) (holding that a conviction based to a decisive extent on a statement in the
absence of an opportunity to challenge violates Article 6(3)(d)); see also Unterpertinger
v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 9133, at 15 (1986); Luidi v. Switzerland, 238 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 1 47, at 21 (1992); Saidi v. France, 261 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 44, at 56 (1993);
Van Mechelen, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, c 63, at 713; Delta v. France, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R.
3 (set. A) 1 36, at 16 (1993) (holding that the opportunity to examine and to protect his
interests must be given to an accused either when a witness gives a statement to be
introduced against him, or in a later proceeding).
294. 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
295. Id. 9 18, at 12.
296. Id. ,191 28-32, at 16-17.
297. Id. 91 30, at 16.
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compromised the witnesses' identity.2 98
On these facts, the European Court found that the Convention was
breached because there had been no prior opportunity to examine the wit-
ness' evidence and the conviction was based to a decisive extent on the
anonymous statements. 299 The Court reiterated that the Convention man-
dates that "all evidence should be produced in the presence of the accused
at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument."30 0 Accordingly, it
held that Article 6(3)(d) requires that an accused "be given an adequate
and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him,
either at the time the witness was making his statement or at some later
stage of the proceedings."'3 0 1 The process of withholding the identity of
the witnesses violated the rights of the accused, under Article 6 insofar as
it:
[deprived the defense] of the very particulars enabling it to demonstrate that
[the witness] is prejudiced, hostile or unreliable. Testimony or other declara-
tions inculpating an accused may well be designedly untruthful or simply
erroneous and the defence will scarcely be able to bring this to light if it
lacks the information permitting it to test the author's reliability or cast
doubt on his credibility.30 2
The Court thus determined that the accused had not received a fair
trial. Not only had he had not been afforded an opportunity to examine
the witnesses at any stage in the proceedings directly, but the anonymity
procedures used in the pretrial and trial phases, rather than respecting
defense rights,30 3 further prejudiced them by restricting even indirect
examination of testimonial witnesses.
Similarly, in Windisch v. Austria,30 4 neither the trial court nor the
defendant was ever provided with an opportunity to examine or hear from
the two anonymous witnesses, upon whose statements the defendant was
ultimately convicted of burglary.30 5 The witnesses both claimed to have
seen the defendant near the scene of a burglary under a street lamp, with
his face obscured in part by a handkerchief. 30 6 At trial, the police officers
who took these statements offered their assessment of the witnesses' relia-
bility, as well as the content of statements in chief.30 7 In the absence of
any eyewitness placing the defendant at the scene of the crime, it was clear
that the main evidence relied upon by the trial court to sustain the convic-
tion rested solely upon the out-of-court declarations of the anonymous wit-
298. Id. 9 16, at 11.
299. Id. 44, at 21.
300. Id. 41, at 20.
301. Id. (citing Unterpretinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 31, at 14-15
(1986)).
302. Id. 42, at 20.
303. Id. 41, at 20 (conditioning the use of unexamined statements upon "the rights
of the defence hav[ing] been respected.").
304. 186 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
305. Id. 12-13, at 7.
306. Id. T 10, at 6.
307. Id. 12, at 7.
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nesses. As such, the Court determined that the accused had not received a
fair trial,30 8 noting in particular that the witnesses' anonymity during the
investigation and subsequent trial impermissibly restricted the defendant's
Article 6 rights.30 9
3. Absence, Unavailability, and Hearsay
In Delta v. France,3 10 the Court determined that the right to confront,
to be present, and to examine adversarial witnesses requires the provision
of an opportunity for an accused to challenge and question the witness
against him, upon the making of the statement or later in the proceed-
ings.3 11 Unlike Kostovski, Delta did not involve anonymous witnesses but
rather witnesses whose identities were known and who failed to appear at
the defendant's trial.3 12 Finding a breach of Article 6, the Court observed
the fact that the accused had not been present during the investigatory
phase of the proceedings when the two witnesses gave statements to the
police. 3 13 Further, he was never afforded a subsequent opportunity to
examine the witnesses. 3 14 To the extent that the statements constituted
most of the material evidence against the accused, they essentially formed
the basis of his conviction. The failure to afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to question the witnesses under these circumstances impermissibly
restricted his Article 6 rights.3 15
In Saidi v. France,3 16 the Court found a violation of Article 6(3)(d) in
similar circumstances. In that case, the accused was convicted of involun-
tary homicide in connection with two drug-related deaths without ever
having been given the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him
during either the course of the investigation or the trial itself.3 17 In its
decision, the Court reasoned that while the use of statements obtained at
the stage of the police inquiry or the judicial investigation is not in itself
inconsistent with Article 6(3)(d), since evidence must be produced with a
view to adversarial argument, the "lack of any confrontation" deprived the
308. Id. '1 31, at 11.
309. Id. TI 27-28, at 11; see Mayali v. France, App. No. 69116/01,9 136-38,June 14,
2005 (available only in French), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=
html&documentld=776754&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69
A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (sexual offence case in which consent was at
issue wherein the Court found a violation of a Article 6(3)(d) where an unavailable
witness's statements to the police and report of an expert who had examined both the
accused and the victim were decisive); see also F. v. Finland, App. No. 22508/02, 9
56-61, July 17, 2007, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/620.html (noting
that the right to examine was violated where the accused's conviction rested on
unpreserved statements given by his absent daughter to a psychologist).
310. 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3 (1993).
311. See id. S 36, at 16.
312. Id. 37, at 16.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. 261 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 40 (1993).
317. Id. 44, at 57.
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accused of a fair trial. 3 18 The Court again observed that these statements
"constituted the sole basis for the applicant's conviction."3 9
Distinguishing the holding in Unterpertinger, the case of Asch v. Aus-
tria320 demonstrated that the inability to examine a witness does not nec-
essarily result in the violation of Article 6(3)(d). Asch involved a victim of
domestic violence who refused to testify at a subsequent trial as she was
entitled to under Austrian law.32 1 However, much like Hammon, a prior
statement that she gave the police about the incident was read into record
at trial, despite her absence.3 2 2 The accused complained that he had not
been afforded an opportunity to examine the declarant. 32 3 Conditioning
the use of the out-of-court statements on "the rights of the defence [having]
been respected," the European Court held that under the peculiar circum-
stances of the case, the accused had not been deprived of a fair trial.3 2 4
Significantly, the Court noted that the statements at issue were not the
only evidence upon which the conviction was predicated insofar as the
trial court had before it corroborative evidence of the crime. 32 5 This case
thus makes clear that Article 6 does not confer an unqualified right of
direct confrontation or examination, but instead comprises a mechanism
permitting the introduction of testimonial hearsay under controlled condi-
tions.326 As seen in some of the cases that follow, the parameters of these
conditions are, at least according to some commentators, unpredictable. 32 7
C. Refinements under the ECHR
1. Corroboration
In Bracci v. Italy,328 the defendant was convicted of several charges,
including theft and sexual abuse against two prostitutes. At trial, the prose-
cution placed particular reliance upon the pretrial statements of the two
318. Id. 43-44, at 56-57 (emphasis added).
319. Id. 1 44, at 57.
320. 203 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) (1991).
321. Id. 'i 16, at 8.
322. Id.
323. Id. l 18, at 8.
324. Id. 28-30, at 10-11.
325. Id. ' 28, at 10; see also Artner v. Austria, 242 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 24, at 11
(1992) (finding no Article 6 violation even in the absence of an opportunity for cross-
examination because the contested statements were not the only evidence on which the
conviction was based).
326. See Pello v. Estonia, App. No. 11423/03, 26, Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.bailii.
org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/294.html, (observing that Article 6(3)(d) "does not require
the attendance and examination of every witness on the accused's behalf. its essential
aim, as is indicated by the words 'under the same conditions', is a full 'equality of arms'
in the matter.") (citing Engel v. The Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, at 38-39
(1976)).
327. See Andrew Choo, supra note 186, at 9 (noting that the jurisprudence of the
European Court on the question of confrontation is of "little predictive value.").
328. App. No. 36822/02, IN 13, 19, Oct. 13, 2005 (available only in French), http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=787947&portal =
hbkm&source~externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BFO1C1 166DEA398
649.
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prostitutes given to police earlier in the investigation. 32 9 The two women
did not appear at trial.3 30 The accused appealed his conviction on the
ground that he was denied a fair trial in two respects: first, that he was
unable to examine either witness and second, that he was unable to obtain
a DNA test of an article of clothing bearing trace evidence.3 3 1 The Euro-
pean Court observed that although the pretrial statements were read aloud
at trial in compliance with Italian criminal procedure, "at no stage in the
proceedings was counsel for the defence able to examine or have examined
the individuals who were accusing the applicant in connection with the two
incidents in question. '3 3 2 However, the Court found that to the extent one
witness's testimony was corroborated by other evidence, there was no
breach of the convention, even in the absence of affording the accused a
right of examination. 33 3 With respect to the remaining witness, the Court
did find a violation of Article 6(1) and 3(d) of the Convention because of
the Italian court's "exclusive" reliance upon the pretrial statements in the
absence of corroboration and without having afforded the accused "an ade-
quate and sufficient opportunity to contest the statements upon which his
conviction [for crimes against that witness] was founded."33 4
The European Court unanimously held in Taal v. Estonia,3 35 that Arti-
cle 6(3)(d) had been violated where the trial court convicted the accused of
threatening to detonate an explosive in a supermarket, relying primarily
upon the testimony of witnesses identifying the defendant that had been
obtained during the preliminary investigation. Despite the accused's
requests, none of the witnesses appeared at trial.33 6 The Court confirmed
the grounds of the accused's complaint-namely, the denial of any oppor-
tunity to examine or have examined the witnesses against him at any stage
of the proceedings. 3 37 Moreover, the Court pointed out the failure of the
national courts to examine any of the witnesses.
338
2. Basis of Unavailability
Bocos-Cuesta v. The Netherlands3 39 involved a conviction for sexual
assault among other offenses committed against four children from which
the accused subsequently appealed. In part, the conviction rested upon the
children's statements to the police.3 40 However, none testified at trial, as
329. Id. 91 17, 20.
330. Id. 1 56.
331. Id. 91 28.
332. Id. 56
333. Id. IN 57-58.
334. Id. 11 59-61.
335. See App. No. 12349/02, 11 29, 33-34, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.bailii.org/eu/
cases/ECHR/2005/749.html.
336. Id. 9 29.
337. Id. 1 35-36.
338. Id. 91 32.
339. App. No. 54789/00, 1 31, Nov. 10 2005, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?action=html&documentld=789034&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydoc
number&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
340. Id. 9 39.
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the trial court determined this might cause them undue trauma. 341 The
European Court disagreed and found that the reason provided concerning
the denial of the defendant's request to "hear the victims [was] insuffi-
ciently substantiated and, to a certain extent, speculative. '342 Accordingly,
the trial was found to be in violation of the accused rights under Article
6.3 43 The Court noted for example, that no accommodation was provided
to the accused to review the manner in which the children provided state-
ments to the police, for example, by watching in another room via closed
circuit video. 34 4 Moreover, the accused had no opportunity to have ques-
tions put to these non-testifying witnesses at any time.345 To the extent
that the police did not record the statements provided, neither the appli-
cant nor the trial judges were able to observe the witnesses' demeanor and
thereby assess the reliability of the testimony. 346 As such, the Court found
that the trial proceedings denied the accused a proper and adequate oppor-
tunity to challenge the witnesses' statements, as well as personally to
observe their giving of oral evidence. 347 Bocos-Cuesta is thus significant
because it inherently recognizes an intrinsic broader confrontational right
under Article 6(1), taken together with Article 6(3)(d).
Zentar v. France348 further confirms a broader confrontational view of
the right to examine. In Zentar, the accused was convicted based "largely"
on the out-of-court statements of witnesses who offered testimony against
the accused at the investigative phase of the proceedings. 349 While the
witnesses implicating the accused were unavailable at trial, no effort had
been made to secure their appearance.3 50 Based upon this failure, and con-
sidering the particular importance of safeguarding the rights of the
accused, the Court determined that the opportunity for the accused to
challenge the witness statements on which his conviction was based had
not been sufficient. 351
Likewise, in Vaturi v. France,352 where the accused alleged that he had
341. Id. 9 40.
342. Id. 72.
343. Id. 73-74.
344. Id. 71.
345. Id. 59.
346. Id. 9l 71.
347. Id. TI 71-74.
348. App. No. 17902/02, Apr. 13, 2006 (available only in French), http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=794312&portal=hbkm&
source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C 1166DEA398649.
349. Id. 9 29.
350. Id. 7 30; see also Makeyev v. Russia, App. No. 13769/04, 43, Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/207.html (finding a violation of Article 6
where, inter alia, "the authorities failed to make a reasonable effort to secure [the wit-
nesses'] presence in court.").
351. Zentar, App. No. 17902/02, 31.
352. App. No. 75699/01, July 13, 2006 (available only in French), http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=794314&portal=hbkm&
source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
(recognizing the obligation of the state to safeguard the rights of the accused as inclusive
of the right to examine and confront).
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been given no opportunity to examine witnesses or to have them examined
at any stage of the proceedings, the Court unanimously found a violation
of Article 6.3 53 Significantly, the Court noted that the question of whether
the examination of the witnesses might have proven fruitful was unneces-
sary to determine whether a breach of Article 6 had occurred, although
such examination would have contributed to the equal balance needed to
be struck throughout the proceedings between the prosecution and the
defense. 354
In Ferrantelli v. Italy,3 55 the accused were implicated by a co-accused
who had been arrested in possession of the murder weapon. 3 56 The
accused later confessed to the crime, providing an account inconsistent
with that of the co-accused. Subsequently, the co-accused recanted his ear-
lier implication of the accused, and the accused also recanted their confes-
sions.3 5 7 The co-accused was later found dead, before either the accused
or his attorneys had a chance to question him.
3 58
In 1991, the Italian Court of Cassation sentenced the accused based,
inter alia, on the statements of the deceased co-accused, the accused's con-
fessions, and other evidence. 35 9 On review before the European Court, the
accused contended that they had been convicted based on confessions
obtained by investigators using physical and psychological pressure. 360
They further argued the impossibility of examining or having examined the
co-accused (as a prosecution witness) prior to his death. 36 1 Although the
use of statements obtained at the pre-trial stage was not inconsistent with
paragraphs (3)(d) and (1) of Article 6, the Court held that these provisions
required that the accused be afforded an adequate and proper opportunity
to challenge and question witnesses either when the statements were being
made or at a later stage of the proceedings. 36 2 While a substantial period
had elapsed prior to the death of the co-accused during which the authori-
ties could have arranged for this opportunity, the Court found that the
State could not be held responsible for the intervening death and as such
Article 6(1) and (3)(d) had not been violated. 36 3
In Gossa v. Poland,364 the Court similarly held that the fact that an
353. Id. IN 58-59; see also Mild and Virtanen v. Finland, App. Nos. 39481/98 and
40227/98, 59 47-48, July 26, 2005, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/541.
html (finding a violation of Article 6(3)(d) where "every reasonable effort to obtain [wit-
nesses'] attendance was not made and the fact that there was no provision of law on the
basis of which they could have been brought to court made it impossible for the appli-
cants to examine them.").
354. Vaturi, App. No. 75699/01, 9 58.
355. 1996-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 937.
356. Id. 9, at 942.
357. See id. 910-14, at 942-43.
358. See id. TI 15-16, at 943.
359. See id. 52, at 950-51.
360. Id. 9 44, at 949.
361. Ferrantelli, 1996-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, 944, at 949.
362. Id. 9 51, at 950.
363. Id. 9 52-53, at 950-51.
364. App. No. 47986/99, Jan. 9, 2007, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/
2.html.
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accused may have been unable to examine a witness whose statements may
have been involved in securing his conviction does not necessarily consti-
tute a violation of Article 6(3)(d). In Gossa, the accused alleged that he had
not been provided any opportunity to challenge the inculpatory statements
of one of the witnesses against him and upon which his conviction was
predicated. 365 In determining that the lack of any opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant did not abridge the accused's Article 6 rights,366 the
Court found it significant that the authorities had made an appropriate
effort to secure this witness' attendance. 367 In addition, the Court deter-
mined that the conviction had not been based solely or to a decisive degree
on that particular witness' statements. 368
3. Impact of Unexamined Statements
The European Court has greatly circumscribed the use of anonymous
testimony as well as hearsay evidence in contravention of an accused's Arti-
cle 6 rights. However, the Court's jurisprudence has held with reasonable
consistency that a fair trial can be achieved even where the accused has not
been accorded a right to examine witnesses, as was the case in Asch v.
Austria.369 Accordingly, there is no absolute procedural bar against the
receipt of pretrial statements of adversarial witnesses against an accused in
the absence of oral testimony.370 With respect to anonymous testimony
however, the Court has taken a more conservative tack in limiting consid-
eration of these types of statements to situations bearing substantial cor-
roboration or in extenuating circumstances. Hence, a trial will be found
fundamentally unfair where a conviction is based to a decisive extent upon
the testimony of an anonymous witness in the absence of any appreciable
opportunity of the defense to examine the witness at any stage of the
proceedings. 371
Although the European Court does not consider the right to cross-
examination absolute,372 limitations imposed on the rights of an accused
under Article 6 must nevertheless be considered restrictively. In Doorson v.
The Netherlands373 for example, although the evidence against the accused
365. Id. l 40.
366. Id. 64.
367. See id. 1 49 (internal citations omitted).
368. Id. 63.
369. 203 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) TI 28-30, at 10-11 (1991).
370. See A.M. v. Italy, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 47, 25, at 55; Luci v. Italy, 2001-Il Eur.
Ct. H.R. 167, 40, at 178; see generally Mild and Virtanen v. Finland, App. Nos. 39481/
98 and 40227/98, July 26, 2005, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/541.
html; but see Rodriguez Orejuela v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communica-
tion No. 848/1999, U.N. Doc. Supp. 40 (A/57/40) at 172 (2002).
371. See Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-lI Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, 76, at 472.
372. See Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 43, at 20-21
(1989); see also Artner v. Austria, 242 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 24, at 11 (1992); Asch v. Aus-
tria, 203 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 31, at 11 (1991) (holding that "the fact that it was
impossible to question [the complainant] at the hearing did not [ ], in the circumstances
of the case, violate the rights of the defence; it did not deprive the accused of a fair
trial.").
373. 1996-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 446.
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included testimony from anonymous witnesses, the Court found that the
opportunity provided to the accused's counsel to examine these witnesses
outside the presence of the accused constituted an acceptable safeguard
under the circumstances, even taking into account the limitation it
imposed on the accused's right of examination.3 74 To the contrary, in Vis-
ser v. The Netherlands,37 5 the Court found that the trial court's attempt to
accommodate the accused's right of examination by affording his counsel
an opportunity to hear the anonymous witness' statement before an investi-
gating judge and to submit written questions to be posed was unaccept-
able.37 6 Although the Court did not reach the question of the sufficiency
of the protective procedures put in place, it appears that no justification for
the limitations imposed upon the rights of the accused had ever been
established; the Court thus concluded that the trial court failed to examine
the seriousness and legitimacy of the reasons advanced for the anonymity
of the witness whose statement was introduced against the accused. 3 77
Importantly however, Visser, like Doorson, confirmed that a conviction
based solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous statements violates Arti-
cle 6.378
In Krasniki v. the Czech Republic379 the European Court also found
that when the trial court had no reason to receive the testimony of wit-
nesses outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel, and based
the conviction to a decisive extent on anonymous testimony, Article 6(1) of
the Convention had been violated.38 0 Krasniki involved a conviction for
possessing and dealing in illicit substances. At trial, the accused was not
permitted to examine a witness whose testimony was taken outside his
presence by the trial judge.3 8 1 A second witness could not be located and
her pretrial statement was read out in court in her absence. 38 2 To make
374. Id. 69-73, at 470-71 (stating that while the "the Convention does not pre-
clude reliance, at the investigation stage, on sources such as anonymous informants, the
subsequent use of their statements by the trial court to found a conviction ... is not
under all circumstances incompatible with the Convention." And "Counsel was not
only present, but he was put in a position to ask the witnesses whatever questions he
considered to be in the interests of the defence except in so far as they might lead to the
disclosure of their identity.").
375. App. No. 26668/95, Feb. 14, 2002, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/
2002/108.html.
376. Id. ' 48 (holding that in the absence of an inquiry as to the seriousness and
basis for the anonymity "the interest of the witness in remaining anonymous could [not]
justify limiting the rights of the defence to the extent that they were limited"); cf. Door-
son v. The Netherlands, 1996-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, 1 74, at 471 (holding that "while it
would clearly have been preferable for the applicant to have attended the questioning of
the witnesses" on balance the domestic court was "entitled to consider that the interests
of the applicant were outweighed in this respect by the need to ensure the safety of
witnesses.").
377. Visser, App. No. 26668/95, '1 47.
378. Id. ' 46.
379. App. No. 51277/99, Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/
2006/176.html.
380. Id. 91 78, 80-83.
381. Id. 1 22.
382. See id. 1 25.
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matters worse, both witnesses testified against the accused anony-
mously.3 8 3 Under these circumstances, the Court unanimously deter-
mined that the proceedings had unfairly breached Krasniki's rights. 3 8
4
4. Statements of Co-Accused
In Isgr6 v. Italy,3 85 the Court determined that the admission at trial of
an accomplice's hearsay statements against the accused was not unfair.
Distinguishing this case from existing jurisprudence at the time, the Euro-
pean Court found first, that the statement in question was clearly not
anonymous; second, that the accused was able to and did put questions to
his accomplice at a hearing before the investigating judge and discussed
the statements; 386 and third, that the statements of the accomplice were
not the sole evidence upon which the court relied. 38 7 The Court acknowl-
edged that the defense counsel had been excluded from the accused's con-
frontation of the witness; however, it also found that this did not affect fair
trial rights because the public prosecutor had also been absent, and
because the accused was allowed and able to put questions to the witness
himself, thus mitigating the absence of defense counsel.388 As dubious an
argument as these grounds present, the Court nevertheless went on to find
that the restrictions placed on the accused did not contravene Article6(3)(d) .3 8 9
However, in Lucd v. Italy39° the European Court did find that reliance
on the untested statements of a co-accused, unavailable through his asser-
tion of his right against self-incrimination, violated Article 6. The court
found the fact that the statement at issue was made by a co-accused imma-
terial (as a matter of reliability), and instead held a blanket proposition that
"where a deposition may serve to a material degree as the basis for a con-
viction, then, irrespective of whether it was made by a witness in the strict
sense or by a co-accused, it constitutes evidence for the prosecution to
383. Id. 1 10-12.
384. Id. 86.
385. 194 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3 (1991).
386. Id. '1 35; but see id. q 36 (noting the absence of a defense lawyer during the
confrontation). Clearly, questioning by the accused without the assistance of counsel at
this stage of the proceedings cannot be viewed as an appropriate substitute for a proper
cross-examination, especially where it is unquestionable that the accused would have
been otherwise entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial for the same purpose. None-
theless, the Court determined that such limitations did not deprive the accused of a fair
trial. See id. 1 37.
387. Id. T 35.
388. Id. 1 36. Astonishingly, no apparent regard was taken of the likely difference in
skill and experience between the accused and his counsel in conducting such examina-
tions, in terms of assessing the adequacy of the opportunity provided to the accused in
relation to the fairness of the proceedings.
389. Id. I 37. The European Court also accepted the trial court's determination that
the accomplice could not be found so as to testify at trial, although it acknowledged that
the accomplice contacted the police during the trial, contacted the investigating judge on
a separate day, and was reported to be living at his mother's house as the trial pro-
ceeded. Id. 91 16-18.
390. 2001-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 167.
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which the guarantees provided by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the Conven-
tion apply."'39 1 Although the relevant law at the time permitted the domes-
tic courts to admit the statement of a co-accused, the European Court held
that this could not operate to the detriment of the accused in violation of
the Convention.3 92
D. The Ground Rules
The foregoing cases establish that the Court will generally defer ques-
tions concerning the admissibility of statements or depositions used at
trial to the primary consideration of national authorities as a matter of
domestic law.393 However, all evidence must generally be produced in the
presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argu-
ment. While there are exceptions, the rights of the defense must not be
infringed.3 94 Witness anonymity must be based on sufficient reasons,3 95
and measures must be undertaken to counterbalance the resultant
prejudice to the accused.39 6 Although the use of statements from an
unavailable witness in the absence of an opportunity for the accused to
question the witness at any stage of the proceedings does not automatically
result in exclusion, where the rights of the defense cannot otherwise be
secured, as normally prescribed under the Convention, such statements
must be used with great care. 39 7 Thus, a conviction based solely or to a
decisive degree upon depositions in the absence of an opportunity to
examine or to have a declarant examined at any phase of the proceedings is
incompatible with Article 6.398
391. Id. 41, at 179.
392. Id. 9 42, at 179.
393. See Rumyana Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03, 39, Feb. 14, 2008, http:/
/www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/150.html (reiterating the view that the European
Court considers it primarily for the national authorities and courts to interpret and
apply domestic law) (internal citations omitted); Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 9 58, at 25 (1992); Casado Coca v. Spain, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 1 43,
at 18 (1994); Perna v. Italy, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, q 29, at 351 (recognising that "the
admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law.").
394. See, e.g., Lucd v. Italy, 2001-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 9 39, at 178; Solakov v. the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 292, 57, at 307-08; P.S.
v. Germany, App. No. 33900/96, 9 21, Dec. 20, 2001, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/
ECHR/2001/884.html.
395. See Doorson v. the Netherlands, 1996-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, C 71, at 471; see also
Visser v. The Netherland, App. No. 26668/95, q 47, Feb. 14, 2002, http://www.bailii.
org/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/108.html.
396. See Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, 54, at 712.
397. See Visser, App. No. 26668/95, 44; see S.N. v. Sweden, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
145, 9 53, at 162.
398. See, e.g., Saidi v. France, 261 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 44, at 56 (1993); Barbera v.
Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 78, at 33-34 (1988); Kostovski v. The Netherlands,
166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 41-45, at 20-21 (1989); Asch v. Austria, 203 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 99 26-31, at 11 (1991), at 10-11; LUdi v. Switzerland, 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
IN 43-50, at 20-21 (1992); Luca v. Italy, 2001-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, IN 39-45, at
178-179.
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E. A New Shift in the European Court's Confrontation Doctrine
On January 20, 2009, the European Court handed down its decision
in Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom.39 9 The case involved the national courts'
admission of statements not subjected to cross-examination against the two
accused under section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 (since
repealed) and section 116 of the CJA 2003, respectively. 400
As mentioned above, the CJA 2003 sets out specific criteria for the
admissibility of the statements of absent witnesses, and includes certain
safeguards concerning the rights of the accused pursuant to sections 124
through 126.401 Although these provisions ostensibly balance the interests
of the defense, 40 2 the Law Commission of England and Wales recom-
mended against the Act's incorporation of the European Court's require-
ment under the ECHR that core hearsay evidence be corroborated.40 3
Despite the obligation of the national courts to consider the judgments of
the European Court, the Act does not require corroboration of hearsay
statements relied upon to a decisive extent in securing a conviction.40 4
Thus, despite the finding of the Court of Appeal that the lower courts'
admissibility determinations were proper and the convictions safe, the
European Court held that Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention had been
breached to the extent the respective convictions were based solely or deci-
sively on statements which the accused had no opportunity to
challenge. 40 5
A-Khawaja does not depart from prior European Court's decisions
insofar as it maintains that convictions founded decisively or solely on
399. A1-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26766/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2009);
see supra Part II.C.1.
400. A-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26766/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2009);
see supra Part II.C.1.
401. See supra notes 126-50, and accompanying text.
402. See R. v. Horncastle, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 964, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, 10, at
21 (appeal taken from Eng.), affd [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47 (noting that
"[the CJA 2003] was... informed by experience accumulated over generations and rep-
resents the product of concentrated consideration by experts of how the balance should
be struck between the many competing interests affected. It also represents democrati-
cally enacted legislation substantially endorsing the conclusions of the expert considera-
tion."); see also CJA 2003, supra note 127, § 125(1)(a)-(b) (imposing upon courts a duty
to direct an acquittal or retrial where it is satisfied that "the case against the defendant is
based wholly or partly on a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings, and
the evidence provided by the statement is so unconvincing that, considering its impor-
tance to the case against the defendant, his conviction of the offence would be unsafe.").
403. See Law Comm'n for Eng. & Wales, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay
and Related Topic, 1997, Law Com. No. 245, 1.50, at 13 (1997) (noting that "there is
no need, under the Convention or otherwise, to introduce a rule that an essential ele-
ment of an offence cannot be proved by uncorroborated hearsay."); see also R. v. Horn-
castle, [2009] EWCA (Crim 964), [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, ' 17, at 24.
404. Human Rights Act 1998, § 2(1), (c. 42) (U.K.) (providing that "[a] court or tribu-
nal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right
must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the
European Court of Human Rights.").
405. Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26766/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 25, at
10 (2009).
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depositions without cross-examination violate Article 6. In this respect, it
will not likely have much impact on the general admissibility of un-con-
fronted hearsay that is neither dispositive of guilt nor otherwise corrobo-
rated. However, the decision presages a significant reorientation in the
Court's analytical doctrine, clearly shifting the emphasis of the extant tele-
ological approach to the right to examine. In particular, the decision artic-
ulates a strengthened position in favor of defense rights, providing that
even where Article 6(3) minimum guarantees have been met the court must
nevertheless ascertain whether the trial as a whole has been fair.40 6 In this
sense, the European Court emphasizes that the provisions of Article 6(3)
do not simply comprise factors or illustrations of fair trial rights, but com-
prise tangible minimum guarantees, requiring extension to anyone charged
with a criminal offense. 40 7 In the event an accused is denied the right to
examine, the trial court must undertake counterbalancing measures. 40 8
The Court reiterated that "[elven when 'counterbalancing' procedures are
found to compensate sufficiently the handicaps under which the defence
labours, a conviction should not be based either solely or to a decisive
extent on anonymous statements."40 9
Furthermore, the Court significantly observed that, absent special cir-
cumstances-for example, witness absence due to fear or unavailability
attributable to the accused's conduct-"[it] doubts whether any counterbal-
ancing factors would be sufficient to justify the introduction in evidence of
an untested statement which was the sole or decisive basis for the convic-
tion of an applicant. '4 10
Prior to Al-Khawaja, however, European Court jurisprudence had
clearly accepted that in exceptional cases the failure to comply with Article
6(3)(d) does not per se invalidate the fairness of a trial. 411 Al-Khawaja now
challenges this conception and portends the closing of the door to the
notion that trial courts may analyze the deprivation of the right to examine
decisive evidence under what amounts to a harmless error analysis if
proper counterbalancing measures are shown. The decision further makes
clear that no distinction concerning the right to examine anonymous wit-
nesses-rather than those merely absent-is required under the Court's
analysis. 412
Because of the far-reaching implications for the English regulatory
scheme under the CJA 2003, which relies on counterbalancing measures,
406. Id. 34, at 13-14.
407. See id.; cf. R.v. Sellick, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 651, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3257, Cf 50, at
3274 (U.K.).
408. Al-Khawaja, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, c 37, at 15.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. See also R. v. Horncastle, [2009) UKSC 14, 12010] 2 W.L.R. 47, CH 73-74, at 113
(appeal taken from Eng.) (observing further that the European Court's case law shows
that the fairness of trial is to be assessed on an ad hoc basis, "an inability on the part of a
defendant to cross-examine the maker of a statement that is admitted in evidence will
not necessarily render the trial unfair.").
412. A-Khawaja, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 36, at 14 (citing LucA v. Italy, 2001-lI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 167, 7 40, at 178).
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Al-Khawaja was appealed to the European Court's Grand Chamber, which
heard argument on the case on May 19, 2010.413 What remains to be seen
is whether the Court will hold its ground in the face of this fierce contest.
If it does, the impact of this decision will significantly strengthen the right
of examination under the Convention and indeed, internationally. How-
ever, the debate is likely to be as highly spirited as hard fought.
V. The Case for a Bright-line Standard in 1CC Proceedings
Although not absolute, 4 1 4 the right to examine embodies normative
objectives that are intrinsically valuable to the truth-finding function of the
trial process. In certain respects, this subsumes adversarial confrontation,
which preserves an accused's opportunity not only to test a witness' recol-
lection of the events at issue, but in essence, to challenge his conscience as
well. A trier of fact is thus provided an opportunity to objectively evaluate
the credibility of accusatory witnesses by observing their demeanor and
the manner in which they present evidence. 4 15 The value of these elements
of the trial process cannot be understated, and their impact cannot be
properly evaluated solely by resorting, after the fact, to an uncertain record
of the proceedings.
Given that "[a] teleological reading of the [Rome] Statute indicates that
the trial ... will be the centrepiece of the Court's proceedings in terms of
acquiring evidence upon which to determine a person's criminal responsi-
bility,"4 16 the importance of securing a reliable and veritable right to
examine trial evidence that is consistent with its core objectives is critical
to the fairness of international criminal proceedings.
While there has been some encouraging movement in this direction by
the European Court,4 1 7 the standard of analysis employed internationally
413. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Hearing Al-
Khawaja and Tagey v. The United Kingdom (May 19, 2010), available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentld=868093&portal=hbkm&
source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1 166DEA398649.
414. See O'Brian, supra note 130, at 494.
415. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (discussing the right
of confrontation); see also Bocos-Cuesta v. The Netherlands, App. No. 54789/00,
71-74, Nov. 10 2005, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&docu-
mentld-789034&portal=hbkm&sourceexternalbydocnumber&tableF69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649 (observing that while a trial court may undertake a care-
ful examination of statements taken from witnesses, giving the accused ample opportu-
nity to contest them, "this can scarcely be regarded as a proper substitute for a personal
observation of a witness giving oral evidence.").
416. Helen J. Brady, Setting the Record Straight: A Short Note on Disclosure and the
Record of the Proceedings, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 265 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001).
417. See Kaste v. Norway, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, 9 53, at 58 (2009) (reiterating that
"where a deposition may serve to a material degree as the basis for a conviction then,
irrespective of whether it was made by a witness in the strict sense or by a co-accused, it
constitutes evidence for the prosecution to which the guarantees provided by Articles
6(1) and (3)(d) of the Convention apply."); see also Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom 49
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 34, at 13-14 (2009) (noting, "[a]s minimum rights, the provisions of
Article 6(3) constitute express guarantees and cannot be read . . . as illustrations of
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is neither definite enough nor sufficient to import wholesale to the ICC
with respect to interpretation and application of Article 67(e). Indeed, "in
an area of law so politicised, culturally freighted and passionately punitive
as war crimes there is a need for even greater protections for the
accused. " 4 18
A. The Admissibility of Written Evidence in ICC Proceedings
The Rome Statute and the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(ICC RPE) provide for the receipt of testimonial statements and written
transcripts in lieu of viva voce testimony; 4 19 such testimony is similarly
considered in the ad hoc tribunals. 420 However, unlike its ad hoc counter-
parts, the ICC's procedural framework presents a substantial improvement
in terms of the protection expressly afforded the right to examine.
The general authority to receive documentary evidence and written
documents is subject to the ordinary admissibility requirements provided
under Article 69(4), affording the Court virtually unfettered discretion.4 2 1
Although the Rome Statute fundamentally rejects the formalistic eviden-
tiary constraints of common law procedure in favor of the more open
matters to be taken into account when considering whether a fair trial has been held.").
This perhaps portends an eventual departure from what has until now been a decidedly
teleological approach to confrontation taken by the European Court.
418. GJ Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAw OF WAR CRIMES:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATInONAL APPROACHES 1, 15 ( T.L.H. McCormack & GJ. Simpson
eds., 1997).
419. International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. No.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov 2, 2000) (entered into force Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter
ICC RPE].
420. See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.7, Rule 92bis (Admission of Written State-
ments and Transcripts in Lieu of Oral Testimony), Rule 92ter (Other Admission of
Written Statements and Transcripts), 92quater (Unavailable Persons) (Mar. 14, 1994)
(last amended Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1, Rule 92bis
(Proof of Facts Other than by Oral Evidence) (June 29, 1995) (amended Mar. 14, 2008)
[hereinafter ICTR RPE]; see Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, Rule 92bis (Alternative Proof of Facts), Rule 92ter (Other Admission of Written
Statements and Transcripts) and Rule 92 quarter (Unavailable Persons) (Jan. 16, 2002)
(amended May 27, 2008) [hereinafter SCSL RPE], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx? fileticket=zXPrwoukovM%3d&tabid=176; STL RPE, supra note 253,
Rule 155 (Admission of Written Statements and Transcripts in Lieu of Oral Testimony),
Rule 156 (Written Statements and Transcripts in Lieu of Examination in Chief), Rule
158 (Unavailable Persons).
421. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(4) (providing, "Itihe Court may rule on
the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, inter alia, the proba-
tive value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial
or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness, in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence."). Other rules of admissibility are limited to rules prohibiting
admissibility in particular circumstances. These include Rule 71, which concerns "the
prior or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or witness;" Rules 70 and 72, which limit
the admissibility of evidence concerning to a victim's consent in sexual offences; and
Rules 74 and 75, which relate to privileged attorney-client communications and the
right against self-incrimination and familial incrimination, respectively.
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admissibility standards of Continental systems, 422 it is nevertheless clear
that probativity and prejudice are at least relevant factors considered by the
Court in assessing the admissibility of all evidence. However, unlike the ad
hoc tribunals, Article 69(4) of the Rome Statute neither invites nor requires
the exclusion of evidence where its prejudice exceeds its probative
value.42 3 Thus, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber observed that
under article 69(4) of the Statute the Chamber may exercise its discretion
when determining the relevance and/or admissibility of any item of evi-
dence. According to article 69(4) of the Statute, probative value is one of the
factors to be taken into consideration when assessing the admissibility of a
piece of evidence. In the view of the Chamber, this means that the Chamber
must look at the intrinsic coherence of any item of evidence, and to declare
inadmissible those items of evidence of which probative value is deemed
prima facie absent after such an analysis.4 24
Article 69(2) further provides that
[tihe testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person, except to the
extent provided by the measures set forth in article 68 or in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. The Court may also permit the giving of viva voce
(oral) or recorded testimony of a witness by means of video or audio technol-
ogy, as well as the introduction of documents or written transcripts, subject
to this Statute and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused.4 25
Thus, unless the admission of documents and written transcripts
would contravene the Rome Statute or the ICC RPE, the Court has broad
discretion to admit them. 42 6 Concomitantly, where no specific rule bars
the admission of such evidence-or at least, where this functionally discre-
tionary determination has been made in the absence of an express provi-
sion-a Chamber may admit any such written testimony in its general
search for the truth. 427
Rule 68 of the ICC RPE also regulates evidence of written testimony
and transcripts as follows:
When the Pre-Trial Chamber has not taken measures under article 56, the
Trial Chamber may, in accordance with article 69, paragraph 2, allow the
introduction of previously recorded audio or video testimony of a witness, or
the transcript or other documented evidence of such testimony, provided
that:
422. D.K. Piragoff, Evidence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 349, 351 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).
423. ICTY RPE, supra note 420 Rule 89(D) (expressly permitting the Court to exclude
evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a
fair trial).
424. See The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 77 (Sept. 30, 2008).
425. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(2).
426. See id.
427. See id. (providing that "[t]he Court shall have the authority to request the sub-
mission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.").
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a) If the witness who gave the previously recorded testimony is not present
before the Trial Chamber, both the Prosecutor and the defence had the
opportunity to examine the witness during the recording; or
b) If the witness who gave the previously recorded testimony is present
before the Trial Chamber, he or she does not object to the submission of
the previously recorded testimony and the Prosecutor, the defence and
the Chamber have the opportunity to examine the witness during the
proceedings. 4 28
The ICC's Trial Chamber has interpreted these provisions, observing
that a Trial Chamber
has the discretion to order that written statements (viz. "the transcript or
other documented evidence of... .] the testimony") are to replace "live" evi-
dence if, but only if, one of the two following conditions are met: either that
the defence and the prosecution have had the opportunity to question the
witness if he or she is not present before the Court, or, for a witness before
the Court, the witness-who gives consent to the introduction of the evi-
dence-is available for examination by the prosecution and the defence.
429
As mentioned above, this presents a marked improvement over the pro-
tections afforded pursuant to the ad hoc tribunals' rules of procedure,
which limitedly acknowledge that the lack of a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant of a written statement proposed for admission may
be one of many factors in determining admissibility, and not a necessary
precondition thereto. 430
While the safeguards provided under Rule 68 are consistent with inter-
national minimum requirements concerning the right to examine as estab-
lished in the jurisprudence of the European Court and in agreement with
the views of the UNHRC, in some respects its provisions go farther. Specif-
ically, it is not limited to transcripts or other written evidence that may be
relied upon to a decisive or considerable extent in sustaining a conviction.
On the other hand, Rule 68 also raises significant issues of concern regard-
ing the adequacy of the right to examine as it may be applied.
First, Rule 68 is indicated only where the Pre-Trial Chamber has not
taken measures pursuant to Article 56 of the Rome Statute. 43 1 It does not
require that the accused be accorded an opportunity to examine a witness
in circumstances where the prosecutor considers an investigation to pre-
sent a unique opportunity to take testimony or a statement from a wit-
428. ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68.
429. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for the Admission of the Prior Recorded Statements of Two
Witnesses, 11 19 (Jan. 15, 2009).
430. See, e.g., STL RPE, supra note 253, Rule 155(A)(i)(g) (providing that the ability to
cross-examine upon the making of the statement is a factor favorable to its admissibil-
ity). Notably, neither the ICTR RPE nor the ICTY RPE contain equivalent provisions.
However, in respect of the admission of written evidence pursuant to the ICTY RPE, Rule
92quater, the lack of cross-examination does not bar admissibility. Instead, it is a factor
in deciding the weight of such evidence. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, et al., Case No. IT-
06-90-T Decision on the Admission of Four Witnesses pursuant to Rule 92quater, 7
(July 24, 2008).
431. See ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68.
Cornell International Law Journal
ness.4 3 2 Instead, Article 56 requires the prosecutor to advise the Pre-Trial
Chamber which may "upon request of the Prosecutor, take such measures
as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceed-
ings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the defence. '43 3 Alterna-
tively, where the prosecutor fails to request such measures, the Trial
Chamber may take appropriate measures upon its own initiative; these,
however, are subject to a right of appeal by the prosecutor. 4 34 Although
Article 56 lays out specific measures to ensure the efficiency and integrity
of the proceedings and to protect the rights of the defense, the right to
examine is not expressly mentioned.4 3 5 As such, the extension of the right
to examine in these circumstances rests solely within the discretion of the
Chamber. Testimony and statements obtained pursuant to Article 56 may
thus be admitted at trial without the defense ever having been afforded a
right to examine, as long as the Pre-Trial Chamber did not consider it nec-
essary at the time, the Prosecution successfully appealed the imposition of
any such measure, or the Trial Chamber deemed its admission fully consis-
tent with a fair trial or necessary for the determination of the truth. 436
Second, Rule 68 concerns the admissibility of "previously recorded
audio or video testimony of a witness, or the transcript or other documented
evidence of such testimony." 4 37 Although this has been held to include writ-
ten statements, 438 there is some question as to whether this interpretation
is supportable as a matter of statutory construction. For example, Article
432. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 56; cf. ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 71(C)
(providing for a "right to attend the taking of the deposition and cross-examine the wit-
ness" where an application for taking a deposition for use at trial is granted); ICTY RPE,
supra note 420, Rule 71(C) (same).
433. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 56(1)(b).
434. Id. 56(3).
435. Id. 56(1)(c) (stating that "[tihe measures referred to in paragraph l(b) may
include: (a) Making recommendations or orders regarding procedures to be followed; (b)
Directing that a record be made of the proceedings; (c) Appointing an expert to assist;
(d) Authorizing counsel for a person who has been arrested, or appeared before the
Court in response to a summons, to participate, or where there has not yet been such an
arrest or appearance or counsel has not been designated, appointing another counsel to
attend and represent the interests of the defense; (e) Naming one of its members or, if
necessary, another available judge of the Pre-Trial or Trial Division to observe and make
recommendations or orders regarding the collection and preservation of evidence and
the questioning of persons; (0 Taking such other action as may be necessary to collect
or preserve evidence.").
436. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(3); see also ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule
47(2) (providing that "[wihen the Prosecutor considers that there is a serious risk that it
might not be possible for the testimony to be taken subsequently, he or she may request
the Pre-Trial Chamber to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the effi-
ciency and integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to appoint a counsel or a
judge from the Pre-Trial Chamber to be present during the taking of the testimony in
order to protect the rights of the defence. If the testimony is subsequently presented in
the proceedings, its admissibility shall be governed by article 69, paragraph 4, and given
such weight as determined by the relevant Chamber.").
437. ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68 (emphasis added).
438. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for the Admission of the Prior Recorded Statements of Two
Witnesses, 18, (an. 15, 2009).
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56-to which Rule 68 expressly refers-concerns the taking of "testimony
or a statement" by the prosecution.4 39 These two terms are substantively
distinct. Taken to its logical end, this might suggest that the admissibility
of a statement, as distinct from testimony, is governed solely by the general
discretionary criteria for admissibility under Article 69(4), which does not
explicitly implicate the right of examination.4 40
On the other hand, accepting that Rule 68 encompasses 'statements,'
as a broad interpretation of the term 'testimony' suggests, one could rea-
sonably conclude that its text extends only to statements that have been
formalized in some way.44 1 Documents-including reports, analysis, or
informal hearsay statements-would not fall under the requirements of
Rule 68, but under the general admissibility provisions of Article 69(4).
This is in part because of the sheer volume of material likely to come
before the court in any given case and because, to the extent that the appli-
cation of Rule 68 to such material effectively would create a hearsay rule, it
would be contrary to the established procedural framework.4 42 Function-
ally however, there is no intrinsic reason why informal statements, reports,
or other hearsay evidence should not give rise to the same considerations
which underlie the protections provided by Rule 68 concerning formal tes-
timony or statements-that is, an opportunity to examine the declarant
during the making of the statement, or during the trial proceedings.
Regardless of their form, these statements can nevertheless be 'testi-
monial' within the meaning of Crawford, particularly in the sense that they
may provide evidence material to the culpability of the accused for the
crimes with which he has been charged. However, as Article 67(e) is not a
rule of admissibility per se, the only practical limitation on the admissibil-
ity of informal testimonial hearsay not subject to Rule 56, or otherwise
subject to Rule 68, rests exclusively in the broad discretion of the Court
under Article 69.44 3 A bright-line standard of admissibility would necessa-
rily limit this discretion in a predictable and uniform way so as to
strengthen the core guarantees embodied in Article 67(e). Of course, the
question of where to draw the line will be a matter of considerable debate
and, necessarily, one of policy. Nonetheless, this debate must also con-
sider the procedural regime of the given institution, as more fully discussed
below.
The ICTY and ICTR, for example, draw the line with respect to the
admissibility of written evidence at statements going to the acts or conduct
of an accused, as provided for under Rule 92bis of their respective rules of
439. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 56(1)(a).
440. Id. art. 69(4).
441. ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68 (allowing the introduction of "other docu-
mented evidence of [a witness'] testimony.").
442. See generally Lubanga Dyilo, 23 (noting the advantages of having evidence read
into the record, as opposed to live testimony).
443. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 9 77, (Sept. 30, 2008).
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procedure. 4 44 Given the length of trials and the amount and complexity of
the evidence involved, the ICTY, for example, has been constrained to
develop expeditious means of presenting evidence. 44 5 As such, Rule 92bis
is "designed to expedite the proceedings on matters that are not pivotal to
the case, by avoiding the need to call and examine the witness and admit-
ting his or her written statement as substantive evidence in lieu of his or
her oral evidence."4 46
In the United States, the question turns on the 'testimonial' character
of the statement,44 7 while in England, like several other Common Law
jurisdictions, the question is framed as one that is fundamentally eviden-
tiary, and thus governed by statutory rules of admissibility aimed at
achieving fairness. 4 48 In this sense, the line will be determined by many
interests, among which the interests of the defense must compete. 449
As noted in Part IV, the ECHR and ICCPR do not define rules of
admissibility. 450 Thus, answers to evidentiary questions arising under
these treaties depend primarily upon the degree to which evidence never
subjected to cross-examination figures in support of a judgment of convic-
tion; in essence, this is a retrospective standard of review, rather than a
444. See ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 92bis; ICTY RPE, supra note 420, Rule 92bis;
see generally Prosecutor v. Galixe, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis(C), cl 10, June 7, 2002 (noting that Rule 92bis(A)
excludes written statements which goes to prove that the accused: (a) personally perpe-
trated any of the charged crimes, (b) planned, instigated or ordered them, (c) aided and
abetted those who committed the crimes in the planning, preparation or execution, (d)
was a superior to those who committed the crimes, (e) knew or had reason to know such
crimes were about to be or had been committed by his subordinates, and (f) failed to
take reasonable steps to prevent or punish those acts) [hereinafter Galiae Interlocutory
Appeal]; see also Prosecutor v. Basogora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Prosecu-
tor's Motion for the Admission of Written Witness Statements Under Rule 92bis, 13,
Mar. 9, 2004 (noting that "Rule 92bis was primarily intended for 'crime-base' evi-
dence."). The admissibility of written statements relevant only to sentencing and the
character of an accused under the ICTR's procedure however, are considered factors
favorable their admission. See ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 92bis (e)-(f).
445. See generally Prosecutor v. Milosevix, Case No. IT-02-54-T (T. Ch.), Decision on
Prosecution Motion for the Admission of Transcripts in lieu of viva voce Testimony Pur-
suant to 92bis(D) - Foca Transcripts, '1 25, June 30, 2003.
446. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Decision on the Prosecu-
tion's Motions to Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence, C1 15, Apr. 25, 2005;
but see Galie Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 444, l 14-15 (acknowledging that state-
ments otherwise admissible under Rule 92bis may be so "proximate to the accused" that
the Chamber may, in the exercise of its discretion, disallow it); see also Prosecutor v.
Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Order Relating to Prosecution's Applications to Admit
Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92bis, l 15, at 2, July, 19 2004 (noting that Rule 92bis is
designed to expedite the presentation of evidence within the constraints of a fair trial).
447. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
448. See R. v. Horncastle, [20091 UKSC 14, [20101 2 W.L.R. 47, 36, at 102 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (observing that the "CJA 2003 contains a crafted code intended to
ensure that evidence is admitted only when it is fair that it should be.").
449. See id. 108, at 124 (remarking that the provisions of CJA 2003 permitting
uncross-examined evidence "strike[s] the right balance between the imperative that a
trial must be fair and the interests of victims in particular and society in general . .
450. See supra Part IV.
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prospective one.4
5 1
In this author's estimation, a reasonable position on the admissibility
of testimonial hearsay in view of the ICC's procedural framework would be
to require the strict application of Article 67(e) and the protections
afforded under Rule 68(a) and (b) as a predicate condition of admissibility
where any statement, whether formal or informal, comprises a material
element of responsibility for the crimes charged, or where such a statement
goes to the proof of the acts or conduct of the accused. This effectively
would fill the lacunae left by ICTY/ICTR procedure, 45 2 address the core
considerations of the right to examine-the receipt of inculpatory state-
ments not subjected to cross-examination-and provide the accused with a
meaningful ability to challenge crime-base evidence within a definite and
predictable analytical framework. At the same time, this would allow for
the receipt of relevant background evidence and evidence not materially in
dispute, saving considerable time and resources in otherwise extremely
lengthy and complex court proceedings.
The desirability of a clear bright-line standard of admissibility in inter-
national war crimes trials is further warranted when one considers several
salient factors and their potential effect on the fairness of such trials. The
most important of these factors are institutional inequality and the applica-
tion of inapposite international standards.
1. Institutionalised Inequality
As set out in Part III, the principle of equality of arms frames the right
to examine as conferred by virtually all modern regional and multilateral
treaties subscribing to fair trial rights.45 3 Article 67 of the Rome Statute
imports the language of these instruments wholesale, providing in relevant
part that:
1) In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a
public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair
451. See, e.g., R. v. Horncastle, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 964, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, Ti
68-70, at 39 (appeal taken from Eng.) (aptly observing that "[njo one can know what
evidence is decisive until the decision-making process is over"); but see Kaste v. Norway,
48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, 11 53-54, at 58 (2009) (suggesting a prospective standard in
stating that "where a deposition may serve to a material degree as the basis for a convic-
tion then, irrespective of whether it was made by a witness in the strict sense or by a co-
accused, it constitutes evidence for the prosecution to which the guarantees provided by
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the Convention apply.") (emphasis added).
452. See Galioe Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 444, [ 9 (noting that Rule 92bis dif-
ferentiates "between (a) the acts and conduct of those others who commit the crimes for
which the indictment alleges that the accused is individually responsible, and (b) the
acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment which establish his
responsibility for the acts and conduct of others. It is only a written statement which
goes to proof of the latter acts and conduct which Rule 92bis(A) excludes ... ").
453. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14(3); ECHR, supra note 3, art. (6)(3); ACHR, supra
note 3, art. 8(2); ACHPR Resolution, supra note 3, art. 2(E); ICTY Statute, supra note 3,
art. 21(4); ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(4); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, art. 17(4), 2178 U.N.T.S. 138, [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; Statute of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 16(4), S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007)
[hereinafter, STL Statute]; Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67(1).
Cornell International Law Journal
hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guaran-
tees, in full equality...
e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her.
454
Although this language is borrowed, the manner of its application
under the procedural regime of the Rome Statute certainly need not be.
Practice, particularly at the ad hoc tribunals, has taught that the reality
of international trials, like their domestic counterparts, do not always live
up to normative notions of equality. In fact, great institutional disparity
between an accused and the prosecution is inherent in the distribution of
power contemplated by the respective organic statutes of international
courts. For this reason, several of these institutions provide dedicated
offices designed to safeguard defense rights during the course of criminal
proceedings. 4 55 Nevertheless, at least one commentator has observed, "the
lack of strong defence institutions in the Rome Statute (following the texts
of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in this respect) makes the inequality
of arms between prosecution and defense more striking."4 56
The ad hoc tribunals' interpretation and application of the principle of
equality of arms as a procedural mechanism further underscores certain
practical weaknesses that affect the fairness of trials.4 57 Indeed, little
attention has been paid to the very real question of the substantive inequal-
454. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67(1)(e).
455. See SCSL RPE, supra note 420, Rule 45 (creating the Office of the Principal
Defender); International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-
04, Reg. 77 (May 26, 2004) (providing for an "Office of Public Counsel for the
Defence.").
456. See Kenneth S. Gallant, Politics, Theory and Institutions: Three Reasons Why Inter-
national Criminal Defence is Hard, and What Might Be Done About One of Them, 14 CriM.
L.F. 317, 327 (2003); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003 231-32
(2003) (observing that "[w]hile prosecutors included experienced international crimi-
nal lawyers from the [Serious Crimes Investigation Unit], the defense was provided by
staff members from East Timor's drastically under-resourced and inexperienced Public
Defenders' Office . . . [n]either the East Timorese nor the international defenders had
any previous experience in crimes against humanity trials.") (emphasis added).
457. See Masha Fedorova et al., Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons
in International Criminal Proceedings 15 (Institute for International Law Working Paper
No. 27, 2009); see also Prosecutor v. Tadiae, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment, 48-49,
July 15, 1999 (noting that "there is nothing in the ECHR case law that suggests that the
principle is applicable to conditions, outside the control of a court, that prevented a
party from securing the attendance of certain witnesses."). Although Tadia implied that
the obligation of the Trial Chamber should be liberally construed, the true procedural
underpinnings in the practical application of the principle of equality of arms were inter-
preted and followed in Prosecutor v. Nahimana, which noted that the defense "had
ample opportunity and resources to defend the Accused under the same procedural con-
ditions and with the same procedural rights as were accorded to the Prosecution." Prose-
cutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Decision on the Motion to Stay the
Proceedings in the Trial of Ferdinand Nahimana, 1 16, June 5, 2003 (emphasis added);
see also Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, 69, June
1, 2001 (observing that equality of arms does not require an equality of resources
among the parties).
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ity that exists between parties. 45 8 As such, some commentators reasona-
bly question whether it is ever possible to put the defense on equal footing
with the prosecution in terms of means and resources. 45 9 Unsurprisingly,
the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber "I" observed that it is "impossible to create a
situation of absolute equality of arms."460 Thus, at least in a normative
sense, it would seem clear that the procedural and substantive guarantees
available to a given accused must not only be interpreted broadly, but
applied as robustly as possible in international criminal tribunals since,
after all, "[the right of an accused to a fair hearing in full equality] is a right
specifically attributed to the defendant and not to any party to the proceed-
ings."46 1 Further, the ICC's Trial Chamber "I" has acknowledged that ICC
cases will present
infinitely variable circumstances in which the court will be asked to con-
sider evidence, which will not infrequently have come into existence, or have
been compiled or retrieved, in difficult circumstances, such as during partic-
ularly egregious instances of armed conflict, when those involved will have
been killed or wounded, and the survivors or those affected may be untrace-
able or unwilling-for credible reasons-to give evidence.4 62
Such cases will thus require a genuine right of confrontation.
Substantive disadvantages to an accused further obtain as the result of
certain constraints concerning material aspects of trial preparation. The
investigation and compulsion of evidence are particularly problematic
areas, which require a vital compensatory right of examination. For
instance, the prosecution may secure a substantial advantage over an
accused in being able to obtain the cooperation of states and the use of
sensitive material that a state would simply never make available to a given
accused for any number of perfectly valid reasons. 4 63 This may substan-
tially compromise an accused's ability to materially rebut or refute inculpa-
tory evidence. Clearly, therefore, the fact that the principle of equality in
human rights law may have to be balanced against these types of compet-
ing interests means that the procedural mechanisms designed to protect an
accused's substantive rights must also seriously take them into account.464
458. See Gabrielle McIntyre, Equality of Arms-Defining Human Rights in the Jurispru-
dence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
269, 272 (2003).
459. See John Jackson, Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribu-
nals Beyond the Adversarial-Inquisitorial Dichotomy, 7 J. INT'L CaIM. JUST. 17, 26-27
(2009).
460. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Defence's
Request to Obtain Simultaneous French Transcripts, 18 (Dec. 13, 2007) [hereinafter
Lubanga Decision of Dec. 13].
461. ZAPPALA, supra note 9, at 113.
462. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1399, Decision on
the Admissibility of Four Documents, 1 24, (June 13, 2008).
463. See ICTY RPE, supra note 420, Rule 70; ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 70; SCSL
RPE, supra note 420, Rule 70; Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 54; ICC RPE, supra note
419, Rule 82.
464. Fedorova et al., supra note 457, at 17 (observing that disclosure obligations may
be "counterbalanced by fundamental competing individual or public interests.").
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ICC judges have acknowledged that the principle of equality of arms
requires that minimum guarantees "must be generously interpreted" in
order to safeguard the right to a fair trial. 46 5 However, built in to a proce-
dural conception of the principle is the inherent danger that competing
interests-even those bearing no relation to the accused's conduct-can all
too easily compromise the right to examine. 466 The broad participatory
right of victims in ICC proceedings is precisely such an area. 46 7 Commen-
tators have thus cautioned that the incorporation of the ICC victim's bill of
rights as a core procedural tenet "may adulterate, and ultimately dilute,
basic structural due process protections of ICC defendants."468 This may
overstate the case somewhat; nonetheless, due process protections are nec-
essarily put at risk where the rights of victims and accused are placed in
competition. 469 The question is whether, in light of the procedural guaran-
tees provided for under Article 67, the right to examine will normatively be
accorded priority in view of the nature and gravity of the crimes charged.
2. Inapposite International Standards
a. Victim participation
As mentioned above, the extent of victim participation raises genuine
questions concerning the substantive equality afforded an accused in ICC
proceedings. The Appeals Chamber has confirmed that Article 68(3) of
the Rome Statute affords victims the right to participate, inter alia, in the
trial phase of the proceedings. 470 While the right of victims to introduce
evidence during confirmation hearings is restricted, 47' the evidence that
may be led and examined in relation to material aspects of the charges
against an accused at trial is quite broad. For example, although the right
to present substantive evidence primarily belongs to the defense and prose-
cution,472 the Appeals Chamber has acknowledged that there is no provi-
465. See Lubanga Decision of Dec. 13, supra note 460, cl 18.
466. See generally Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/
32/Rev. 44 (Dec. 16, 2009) (amending ICTY RPE in order to provide for the admissibil-
ity of written statements of witnesses subject to interference). While this amendment
covers culpable behavior by an accused resulting in the unavailability of evidence, it
does not exclude from its ambit interference with witnesses caused by sources unrelated
to the accused.
467. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 68(3) (allowing victims whose "personal
interests" are affected to present "their views and concerns"); see also Charles P. Trum-
bull IV, The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings, 29
MICH. J. INT'L L 777, 796 (2008) (observing that victims have "the same right as the
Defence and Prosecution to introduce evidence in ICC proceedings.").
468. Gordon, supra note 12, at 698-99 (citing Alison M. Danner &Jenny S. Martinez,
Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Develop-
ment of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 146 (2005)).
469. See Cristian DeFrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Proce-
dure Matters, 87 VA. L. REv. 1381, 1437 (2001).
470. Trumbull, supra note 467, at 796-97.
471. See The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-474, Deci-
sion on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-
Trial Stage of a Case, sT 101-03, 110-12, May 13, 2008.
472. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(3).
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sion in the Rome Statute or ICC RPE that "preclude[s] the possibility for
victims to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused
and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence during the trial
proceedings. '47 3 The Appeals Chamber has observed that "if victims were
generally and under all circumstances precluded from tendering evidence
relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused and from challenging the
admissibility or relevance of evidence, their right to participate in the trial
would potentially become ineffectual. ' 474 The extension of such rights at
trial thus provides victims with a meaningful right of participation as
intended by Article 68(3). 4 75
While the extension of victim participatory rights does not necessarily
entail a correlative reduction in the protection afforded an accused, it
clearly raises the possibility. Insofar as the guarantees provided under
Article 67(e) emerge from an Adversarial modality, there is a serious ques-
tion as to whether, as applied, it can adequately accommodate victims' par-
ticipatory interests without substantively undermining those of the
defense. ICC Appeals Chamber Judge Pikis observes that the participation
of victims envisioned under Article 68(3)
has no immediate parallel to or association with the participation of victims
in either the common law system of justice as evolved in England and Wales,
where no role is acknowledged to victims in criminal proceedings except for
the right to initiate a private prosecution, or the Romano-Germanic system of
justice, where victims in the role of civil parties or auxiliary prosecutors have
a wide-ranging right to participate in criminal proceedings. 47 6
In this sense, the right to examine does not contemplate the substan-
tial participation of victims. Indeed, as a precursor of Article 67(e), Article
6 of the European Convention reflects this position as well, particularly
insofar as it contains no explicit requirement that the interests of victims
be taken into consideration.4 7 7 As such, the emergent rules are calculated
to safeguard these interests within a procedural paradigm which subsumes
an adversarial right to examine within the broader context of the burden of
proof which limits confrontation to the evidence adduced by the prosecu-
tion.4 78 As an element of fundamental fairness, the principle of equality of
arms in view of the burden of proof further requires that an accused can-
not be compelled to confront more than one accuser-"[h]olding the scales
473. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-925 OA9
OA10, Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Cham-
ber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, 1 94 (July 11, 2008) [here-
inafter Appeals Judgment on Victims' Participation].
474. Id.
475. Id. 97.
476. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-925 OA8
(Appeals Chamber), Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Vic-
tims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the "Directions and Decision
of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M.
Pikis, 11 (June 13, 2007) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Pikis Separate
Opinion].
477. See Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, T 70, at 470.
478. Pikis Separate Opinion, supra note 476, '1 18.
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even between the parties with the burden of proof cast upon the Prosecutor
rules out a second accuser."4 7 9
Given that the ICC's procedural framework leaves both the substance
and scope of a victim's participation exclusively within the discretion of
the Court,480 the adequacy of the protection afforded an accused's right to
examine is at best uncertain, as it is determined on a case-by-case basis.
Further, requiring "[vigilance] in safeguarding the rights of the accused...
[taking] into account, inter alia, whether the hearing of such evidence
would be appropriate, timely or for other reasons should not be
ordered,"4 8 1 is hardly a concrete analytical mechanism by which core fair
trial rights may be reliably safeguarded.
It is difficult to imagine how the broad participatory rights of vic-
tims-which will likely run contrary to the interests of an accused-can
avoid having a significant impact on the balance of equities between the
prosecution and defense, such that the extant due process mechanisms
that support the ICC's procedural framework can be applied, as they would
be in the absence of any such third-party intervention.
b. Incongruity of the teleological approach
The two principle considerations that underlie the teleological
approach taken by the UNHRC and European Court concerning the scope
of the right to examine are dictated by necessity: first, the establishment of
a flexible analytical framework capable of accommodating divergent cul-
tural and legal systems and second, the establishment of an international
consensus on minimal standards of fairness. 48 2 However, both of these
considerations are extraneous to the fundamental objectives of the Rome
Statute.
As set out above, the European Court (similarly to the UNHRC) con-
siders that:
the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national
law and as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence
before them. The Court's task under the Convention is not to give a ruling as
to whether statements of witnesses were properly admitted as evidence, but
rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in
479. Id. 19.
480. Appeals Judgment on Victims' Participation, supra note 473, 86 (noting that
"victims participating in the proceedings may be permitted to tender and examine evi-
dence if in the view of the Chamber it will assist in the determination of the truth, and if
in this sense the Court has 'requested' the evidence.") (quoting Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on Victims' Participation,
Jan. 18, 2008, 108); see also id. 95 (providing for the exercise of participatory right
"at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court.").
481. Appeals Judgment on Victims' Participation, supra note 473, T 100.
482. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L. J. 273 (1997) (discussing the problems
involved in integrating diverse national legal systems into a supranational one); Kate
Kerr, Note, Fair Trials at International Criminal Tribunals: Examining the Parameters of
the International Right to Counsel, 36 GEO. J. INr'L L. 1227 (2005) (discussing problems
in maintaining basic standards of fairness in international criminal tribunals).
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which the evidence was taken, were fair. 48 3
Unlike the European Court, the ICC is neither designed, nor bound, to
defer to the evidentiary rules and standards of any other jurisdiction. Con-
trary to the ICCPR and ECHR, the ICC is expressly required to interpret
and apply its own statute and procedural rules pursuant to a uniquely
established hierarchy.48 4 Although in many respects these rules mirror
those of other international jurisdictions, they are nevertheless distinct
within the Court's homogenous framework. Moreover, they are at least
presumably calculated to achieve the highest standards of procedural and
substantive fairness-as opposed to the merely minimum consensus-led
safeguards that are designed to embrace widely-divergent systems under
the ICCPR and European Convention. Thus, although a broad-based teleo-
logical approach to the right to examine may be explainable, and indeed
justifiable, in crafting a manageable approach to assess diverse legal tradi-
tions, the rationale for following this approach and its derivative rules in a
unitary system does not hold.
Furthermore, the ICC's unique procedure supports the adoption of an
admissibility analysis that focuses specifically on the values and standards
expressed in the ICC RPE and the Rome Statute as normative deontological
objectives. Article 21 of the Rome Statute establishes an arguably sui
generis hierarchy concerning the law applied by the Court,48 5 providing
amongst other things for the application of the "Statute, Elements of
Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence" and requiring that "the
application and interpretation of law ... must be consistent with interna-
tionally recognized human rights. '4 86 This, of course, does not mean that
the implementation of these rights must be co-extensive with the minimum
safeguards established under the ICCPR and European Convention.
Rather, the Court's authority to interpret its own statute and procedure
readily distinguishes its purpose from that of the UNHRC and European
Court, and affords the Court the ability to depart from the dogma underly-
ing these minimal protections and to more fully protect the adversarial
examination of witnesses as a core right of its own importance.
483. Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-i Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, 3 67, at 470 (emphasis
added); Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, 9 50, at 711; P.S.
v. Germany, App. No. 33900/96, 19, Dec. 20, 2001, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/
ECHR/2001/884.html; see also Teixeira De Castro v. Portugal, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
1451, 34, at 1462; Allan v. The United Kingdom, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 3 42, at 55.
484. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21.
485. See Gilbert Bitti, Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and
the Treatment of Sources of Law in the Jurisprudence of the ICC, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 286-87 (Carsten Stahn & G6ran Sluiter eds.,
2008).
486. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(1) (providing further that the court must
apply "[in thefirst place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.") (emphasis added).
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c. The nebulous 'decisive extent'/'considerable weight' standard
As set out above, the doctrine of the European Court regarding the
right to examine permits a court to take full account of evidence subjected
to neither confrontation nor cross-examination, provided a conviction is
not based solely or to a decisive extent thereupon.4 7 Similarly, the
UNHRC proscribes convictions in which statements not subjected to cross-
examination are given "considerable weight."48 8 As there has yet to be a
conviction before the ICC, it remains unclear whether the Court will adopt
either of these of standards. Nevertheless, both present at least two funda-
mental problems. First, there is a definitional issue: how extensive must
reliance be to qualify as a 'decisive'? Or how much weight amounts to 'con-
siderable weight'?489 Second, these standards are necessarily retrospective
and thus more suitable for a standard of review, rather than service as a
standard of prospective admissibility at trial.
The European Court has captured the notion of decisive evidence in a
variety of ways, such as, evidence having "decisive importance for the legal
characterization of the offence; ' 490 evidence upon which a conviction is
"based mainly;"491 or evidence which has "played a part establishing the
facts which led to the conviction." 492 Still other cases have found viola-
tions of Article 6 where a conviction is "solely or to a decisive degree" based
on statements not subjected to cross-examination. 493 This shows that the
Court's jurisprudence does not establish any clear threshold beyond which
a conviction becomes impermissibly based on testimony not subjected to
cross-examination, excepting the rare situation where such evidence is
indeed the sole evidence supporting a conviction. Relatedly, to this
author's knowledge, the Court has never found trial proceedings to be fair
when the accused has been unable to test, however defined, the 'sole' or
'decisive' evidence underpinning a conviction. Nevertheless, while this
ambiguity may reflect the Court's need to further define minimum stan-
dards of fairness applicable across diverse procedural systems, the current
standard plainly suffers from the same substantive shortcomings as those
487. See Law Comm'n for Eng. & Wales, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay
and Related Topic, Law Com. No. 245, 5.24, at 64 (1997) (observing that "although
Article 6(3)(d) puts limits on the extent to which the prosecution may make use of
hearsay evidence, nothing in Article 6 restricts the use of hearsay evidence by the
defence.").
488. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14(3)(e); Makeyev v. Russia, App. No. 13769/04,
11 34-36, Feb. 5, 2009.
489. For a similarly malleable standard in the American context, see Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (articulating the famous "I
know it when I see it" standard of review in respect of determining the scope of an
obscenity statute).
490. Makeyev, App. No. 13769/04, T 43.
491. Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), l 33, at 15 (1986).
492. Liidi v. Switzerland, 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 47, at 21 (1992); see also Tax-
quet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, 165, Jan. 13, 2009, (articulating Ldi's corroboration
requirement, conversely as "whether the conviction is based to a significant extent on
other evidence not derived from anonymous sources.") (emphasis added).
493. Sadak v. Turkey (no. 1), 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 65, at 285-86 (emphasis
added).
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recognized in Crawford's criticism of Ohio v. Roberts; namely that a frame-
work based upon amorphous criteria that is unpredictable fails to provide
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations. 49 4
The fact that the European Court will not permit a conviction to stand
where uncross-examined or untested hearsay is 'decisive' to a given convic-
tion is of little assurance to an accused insofar as "the court will not find
that a trial was unfair simply because hearsay evidence was most likely a
major factor in the defendant's conviction. '4 95 Indeed, it is not a stretch to
conclude that the mere fact that a court may take account of testimony not
subjected to cross-examination "will always be because the court considers
it a 'decisive' part of that evidence. '4 96 In this sense, the standard is at best
extremely difficult and impractical to apply and assess. As a prospective
standard of admissibility, it would imply that every piece of hearsay evi-
dence would have to be evaluated to determine if it could be dispositive
(whether decisively or solely)-a clearly difficult, impractical and unpre-
dictable endeavor.49 7 On the other hand, as a standard of review, it may
very well be impossible to determine whether a particular statement was
truly decisive or given considerable weight in establishing a conviction in
the face of a well-reasoned decision claiming precisely the opposite.
d. Devaluation of the impact of crime-base and background evidence
The decisive extent rule, like that of the ad hoc tribunals prohibiting
acts or conduct evidence, undervalues the impact of crime-base evidence in
international war crimes trials. While as a general proposition, the more
crucial evidence is to the guilt of an accused, the more carefully a court
must account for its reliability and its fair adduction at trial, crime-base or
background evidence-even that necessary to establish liability-tends to
be an exception. Hearsay is regularly admitted to establish fundamental
elements of international crimes, while so-called linkage evidence estab-
lishing the responsibility of the accused tends to be more carefully scruti-
nized.498 However, inasmuch as considerable or decisive evidence may
carry a risk of unreliability and thus require testing through confrontation,
there is no particular reason why evidence that is not decisive or considera-
494. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
495. Conor Mulcahy, Unfair Consequences: How the Reforms to the Rule Against Hear-
say in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Violate a Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, 28 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 405, 423 (2005)
(citing Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of
Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 777, 791 (2003)).
496. Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, 10, at 724 (Van
Dijk, J., dissenting).
497. See R. v. Horncastle, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 964, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, 1 69, at
39 (observing that identifying which hearsay evidence is the sole evidence in a case in
advance may not be initially clear, as proffered corroborative evidence may successfully
be challenged, and that conversely, evidence that stands alone may come to be sup-
ported by evidence during trial).
498. See generally Jackson, supra note 459, at 28-33 (2009) (discussing the admissi-
bility of evidence in international criminal tribunals, including the "crime base" and
"conduct of the accused" evidence).
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ble is any less risky, or why testing through confrontation is any less neces-
sary. The importance that a statement not subjected to cross-examination
has to a conviction is distinct from its reliability, and it is reliability to
which the right of examination essentially attends.
e. The corroboration requirement
Although the decisive extent standard requires the corroboration of
dispositive evidence that has not been subjected to cross-examination in
order to sustain a conviction,4 9 9 this too is insufficiently defined. Simi-
larly to the European Court, the ICTY holds that convictions cannot be
based solely or in a "decisive manner" on witness depositions concerning
the accused's acts or conduct in the absence of an opportunity to examine
or have examined such witnesses during the investigation or at trial, unless
such depositions are otherwise corroborated. 500
In the contempt case of Haraqija and Morina,50 1 the accused and
another were convicted of contempt of court for intimidating a witness in
another case. Haraqija's conviction was based upon the statements of his
co-accused, who claimed, inter alia, that Haraqija had directed him to pre-
vail upon a witness not to testify against Haraqija.5 0 2 To the extent that
Haraqija's conduct was found to be an integral part of the conduct of his
co-accused in intimidating the witness,5 0 3 the Trial Chamber found
Haraqija guilty of contempt.50 4
On appeal, Haraqija argued that the dispositive evidence against him-
a statement given by his co-accused to the office of the prosecutor implicat-
ing Haraqija in the conduct subject to the contempt proceeding- should
not have been admitted. 50 5 The statement was admitted at trial even
though his co-accused refused to testify.50 6
In its judgment, the Trial Chamber found the co-accused's statement
to be sufficiently corroborated by an intercepted conversation involving the
co-accused, in which the co-accused told the witness that he had been sent
by Haraqija.50 7 The defense challenged this evidence, arguing that the cor-
roboration relied upon by the Trial Chamber was in fact derived from the
same source-a source not subjected to cross-examination-and thus could
not legally support the conviction consistently with Haraqija's right to
499. See Kirst, supra note 257, at 796-97.
500. See Prliae Appeal, supra note 253, 9c1 41, 53; see also Prosecutor v. Milan Martim,
Case No. IT-95-1 1-AR73.2, Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber's Decision on
the Evidence of Witness Milan Babix, 9 12, Sept. 14, 2006; Prosecutor v. Popovia, Case
No. IT-05-88-AR73.1, Decision on Appeals against Decision Admitting Material Related
to Borovcanin's Questioning, 91 48, Dec. 14, 2007.
501. See Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqija, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4, Judgement, Dec. 17,
2008 [hereinafter Haraqija Trial Judgement].
502. Id. 91 6.
503. Id. 60, 100, 102.
504. Prosecutor v. Haraqija and Morina, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4-A, Judgment, T 5,
July 23, 2009 [hereinafter Haraqija Appeal Judgement].
505. Id. 17 17-19.
506. Id.
507. Haraqija Trial Judgement, supra note 501, 9 13.
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examine. 50 8 Indeed, the Trial Chamber determined that corroborating evi-
dence in this context "may include pieces of evidence that, although
originating from the same source, arose under different circumstances, or at
different times and for different purposes.
50 9
While the Appeals Chamber determined that the Trial Chamber erred
in placing decisive weight on the testimony of Haraqija's co-accused, it held
so not because it considered that corroboration sufficient to sustain a con-
viction may not be derived from other evidence not subject to cross-exami-
nation; instead, it held as it did because of the Trial Chamber's failure to
ascribe the appropriate weight to certain ambiguities and deficiencies
found in the account of the co-accused. 5 10
In the Haraqija case, the Appeals Chamber appears to have reached the
right result. However, in applying the prescribed ICTY standard to ICC
proceedings, the inherent danger to the right to examine is plain. Moreo-
ver, it speaks directly to the difficulties inherent in an essentially adopted
international standard, in this case resulting in the suggestion that a
declarant's prior statements which had not been subjected to cross-exami-
nation can be used as corroboration of later statements that are similarly
uncontested, even if such later statements substantially underlie or deci-
sively determine a given conviction.
Even if uniformly applied, the requirement of corroboration as it
stands is still deficient in as much as the presence of corroborating evi-
dence does not necessarily mean that a conviction is not, or indeed could
not be, based to a decisive extent on the untested evidence.5 1 ' In this
sense, the scope of the right to examine ultimately turns upon an impracti-
cal and difficult fact-intensive ad hoc review of the evidence which,
although arguably appropriate as a minimum standard of review of the
fairness of trials among diverse legal systems, should have no plausible
application to ICC trials.
Conclusion
Transplanted legal concepts such as the right to examine cannot be
expected to carry the same import or to achieve the same goals as those
contemplated within their original procedural framework. The character of
a given legal culture manifests a blend of procedure and substance which,
although not simple equivalents, are "ultimately ... inseparable, and will
be misunderstood if analyzed as distinct."5 12
508. Id. 21-22.
509. Id. 41 (emphasis added); cf. Spencer, supra note 175, at 259 (observing that
Article 6 of the ECHR precludes dispositive hearsay evidence "unless it was corroborated
by some other significant piece of evidence, to which the same objection cannot be
made.").
510. Haraqija Appeal Judgement, supra note 504, 91 65-68.
511. See Haraqija Trial Judgement, supra note 501, 24.
512. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 80
(2001).
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Because the right to confront or examine generally proceeds from a
matrix of complementary procedural and substantive considerations pri-
marily within the Adversarial tradition, its hybridization into the proce-
dures of the ICC warrants careful consideration of the constituent elements
necessary to maintain its purpose and effectiveness. Safeguarding the right
in such circumstances necessarily entails a reliable and consistent
approach to the interpretation of relevant procedural rules. Nebulous ana-
lytical standards that circumscribe the right to examine render it all the
more susceptible to the weaknesses which attend hybridization, particu-
larly in the absence of an equivalent complement of procedural safeguards
normally present in the original legal setting thereof.5 13
As an institution, the ICC must share in the broad expectation that it
"fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of
an accused at all stages of its proceedings. '5 14 It should command no less
esteem than that hoped for in the creation of other international tribunals,
namely to "establish itself as the preeminent defender of human rights and
particularly the right of every accused to a fair trial according to the most
exacting standards of due process required by contemporary international
law."'5 15 So far as "[t]he provisions of the Rome Statute and the practice of
the international tribunals require [international] courts to aspire to the
highest standards set by international human rights treaties, customary
international law, and general principles of law,"5 16 the rights of the
accused to a fair trial should never be regarded as either ancillary or
mediate.
Like the Rome Statute, the London Charter-which established the
International Military Tribunal in Europe after World War Il-also pro-
vided for a right of examination.5 17 However, the International Military
Tribunal's application of this right was pointedly criticized because of the
extensive use of ex parte affidavits in contravention of an accused's ability
to effectively confront witnesses and evidence. 5 18 In this context, and in
513. Examples of such nebulous standards include the American "sufficient indicia
of reliability" test, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980), and the European Court's
"decisive extent" test, Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-lI Eur. Ct. H.R. 446 1I 76, at
272.
514. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragrapgh 2
of the Security Council Resolution 808, c 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (referring
to the establishment of the ICTY).
515. Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 237 (1996).
516. Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 117 (2002).
517. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, § IV, art. 16(e), Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (providing that "[a] Defendant shall have the right through
himself, or through his Counsel to present evidence at the trial in support of his defence,
and to cross-examine any witness called by the prosecution."); cf. International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, § III, art. 9(d), Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20
(providing that the right to a fair trial is subject to "such reasonable restrictions as the
Tribunal may determine.").
518. See Amann, supra note 55, at 819-20 (2000) (noting that the London Charter's
protections were minimal and that contrary to Article IV, defendants did not receive fair
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view of the fact that "[tihe Rome Statute does not contain any categorical
prohibitions or restrictions on the introduction of affidavit testimony,"519
it is extremely important that ICC proceedings infuse the right to examine
with real substance. Indeed, its application must be more than a nod in the
right direction wholly dependent upon the best intentions of international
judges.
Because the use of affidavit and transcript evidence is, and will
remain, a fundamental part of international criminal procedure, Article
67(1)(e) cannot merely aspire to the acceptable minimal international stan-
dards. Instead, it must reliably ensure a meaningful and predictable oppor-
tunity for an accused to adversarially examine trial witnesses. If we
proceed upon the premise that the process of determining the guilt or inno-
cence of an accused is no less important than its result, it is easy to see why
a well-defined right to confrontation best approximates fairness within the
context of the ICC's hybridized procedure, and provides the most effective
way to fulfill the normative objective of testing the reliability of evidence
before the court. A bright-line standard of admissibility provides the clar-
ity, predictability, and regularity needed for international proceedings to
live up to the adage that "[a] vigorous, unintimidated, knowledgeable
defense is the sine qua non of a fair trial."
520
trials). See generally M. CHERIF Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 408 (2003) (acknowledging that procedural rights afforded by the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal were "quite limited"); ZAPPALA, supra note 9, at 18 (noting the heavy use of affida-
vits and depositions without confrontation).
519. DeFrancia, supra note 469, at 1430.
520. Patricia M. Wald, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural Colloquium: The
UN and the Protection of Human Rights: The International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an Interna-
tional Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 87, 102 (2001).

